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Interpreting the Illinois Constitution: Understanding
the Rights Afforded by a Modern Charter
Brett Legner*
Every state has its own constitution. But state constitutions are
frequently overlooked or misunderstood as independent sources of civil
rights, as the emphasis tends to be on the rights guaranteed by the
Federal Constitution. This Article seeks to examine the important role
that a state constitution may play in creating important rights for a state’s
citizens. In particular, the modern Illinois Constitution of 1970 provides
an excellent illustration of the ways that a state constitution can differ in
scope and purpose from its federal counterpart and can embody changed
or evolved social values or concerns.
Moreover, even where the state constitution appears to cover the same
ground as the Federal Constitution, the state charter may be interpreted
to provide more protection than the federal document. Over the course
of the last three decades, the Illinois Supreme Court has refined its
interpretive approach to analyze Illinois constitutional provisions in this
situation. Tracing the development of the court’s approach reveals
significant points about the relationship between the federal government
and the states, and examining the approach in practice sheds light on a
number of important state constitutional rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Under the unique system of federalism inherent in the American form
of government, states are accorded the status of sovereigns.1 In
recognition of this sovereignty, a federal court often relies on federalism
as the basis for it declining to undertake some action, often through the
application of an abstention doctrine,2 or in cabining the preemptive reach
of a federal law.3 Other times, lower federal courts recognize that they
do not have the power to review the judgments of the state courts;4 that
power is reserved for the Supreme Court, and then, only when no
independent and adequate state law ground for the state court decision
exists.5
1. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 350–51 (1819) (discussing areas of federal and
state sovereignty in the American system of federalism).
2. See, e.g., Rohm & Haas Co. v. Local 367, United Steel Workers Int’l Union, No. 3:06CV278-H, 2007 WL 855007, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2007) (“Generally, abstention is a doctrine
founded upon the principles of comity and federalism under which federal courts may decline to
interfere with ongoing state proceedings of various types.”).
3. See Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 922 (1997) (“When pre-emption of state law is at issue,
we must respect the principles that are fundamental to a system of federalism in which the state
courts share responsibility for the application and enforcement of federal law.” (internal quotation
marks and brackets omitted)).
4. See generally Long v. Shorebank Dev. Corp., 182 F.3d 548 (7th Cir. 1999) (explaining that
“lower federal courts do not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims seeking review of state
court judgments”).
5. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1040–41 (1983) (recognizing “respect for the
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One brilliant aspect of American federalism is that every state has a
state constitution. Each state’s constitution enumerates rights held by
citizens of that particular state and restrictions placed on that state
government.
Accordingly, citizens typically have two sets of
constitutional rights: those provided by the Federal Constitution and
those provided by their state’s constitution. To be sure, the Supremacy
Clause ensures that the federal constitutional rights provide a floor below
which no government can sink.6 Therefore, if a state constitution in a
certain circumstance provided lesser protection than the Federal
Constitution, the state constitution would be ineffective.7
On the other hand, one can read state constitutions to augment or
expand individual liberties, as Justice Brennan wrote: “State
constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often
extending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation
of federal law.”8 One way state constitutions may provide greater
individual protections is that they often contain more enumerated
protections than the Federal Constitution.9 States have likely adopted
their respective constitutions after the Federal Constitution, but some may
have been overhauled much more recently, so, state constitutions reflect
more modern understandings of individual liberties that may have been
expressed vaguely, if at all, in the United States Constitution. That holds
true in Illinois, where the current constitution was adopted in 1970 and
includes, for instance, explicit protection against discrimination on the
basis of sex10 as well as a guarantee of a “healthful environment.”11

independence of state courts,” as well as the “desire to avoid advisory opinions’ as the
“cornerstones of this Court’s refusal to decide cases where there is an adequate and independent
state ground”).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall
be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority
of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land.; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
notwithstanding.”).
7. See generally John Shaw, Principled Interpretations of State Constitutional Law—Why Don’t
the “Primacy” States Practice What They Preach?, 54 U. PITT. L. REV. 1019, 1026 (1993)
(discussing the variations between state constitutions and the Federal Constitution and the
consequences of these disparities).
8. William Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1977).
9. As one example, the bill of rights of the Illinois Constitution contains twenty-five separate
provisions, and several of those provisions provide for multiple rights. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I.
For instance, article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution protects against unreasonable searches
and seizures as well as unreasonable invasions of privacy and unreasonable interceptions of
communications. Id. art. I, § 6.
10. Id. art. I, § 18.
11. Id. art. XI, § 2.
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Furthermore, state constitutions may be more easily amended than the
Federal Constitution and, in that way, can express modern conceptions of
individual liberties.12 And state constitutions do not need to reflect a
national consensus, as does their federal counterpart. Instead, a state
constitution may reflect concerns or values that may not be held
nationally, but are important to the citizens of that state.13
The focus on the interpretation of state constitutions and the rights
guaranteed thereunder was reignited in the late 1970s, shortly after
Illinois adopted its current charter.14 The Illinois Constitution of 1970
contains provisions for which there is no counterpart in the Federal
Constitution as well as provisions that mirror the language or meaning of
the federal charter. Therefore, for the last forty-six years, Illinois courts
have interpreted and applied Illinois constitutional guarantees that are
unknown to federal law. And for the last three decades, Illinois courts
have expressly grappled with the question of whether, and when, to
interpret Illinois constitutional provisions differently than federal courts
interpret cognate provisions of the Federal Constitution.
This Article explores the method by which the Illinois courts interpret
the Illinois Constitution, especially when deciding whether to read an
Illinois provision more broadly than the Supreme Court has interpreted a
similar provision contained in the United States Constitution. It also
examines the practical effect of that methodology as well as highlights
some protections that are unique to the Illinois Constitution and courts’
interpretation of those protections. In short, this Article serves as an
introduction to Illinois constitutional interpretation and the rights that
12. Logically, only the state’s voters need to approve an amendment to their state’s constitution.
But to ratify an amendment to the United States Constitution, thirty-eight states must approve. See
U.S. CONST. art. V. Article XIV of the Illinois Constitution governs “constitutional revision” and
provides for amendment through constitutional convention on the initiative of the General
Assembly, or for structural or procedural subjects—amendments to the legislative article—by
popular initiative. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XIV. Amendments to the Illinois Constitution require
a three-fifths majority.
13. Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165,
195 (1984); see Shaw, supra note 7, at 1027 (discussing the permissible variations between state
constitutions and the Federal Constitution). Of course, Justice Linde points out that the fact that
the Illinois Constitution has an environmental clause and the Oregon Constitution does not, may
not reflect a heightened environmental awareness in Illinois, but rather the fact that the Illinois
Constitution was adopted in 1970 and the Oregon Constitution was adopted before the Civil War.
Linde, supra, at 195.
14. Credit for this is often given to Justice Brennan, who finding himself in the minority on the
Burger Court during a retrenchment of the Warren Court’s civil rights expansion, wrote an
influential article calling upon states to interpret their constitutions to provide civil liberty
protections. See Brennan, supra note 8, at 502–04 (discussing the important role state constitutions
play in protecting civil liberties); see People v. Caballes (Caballes I), 851 N.E.2d 26, 40–41 (Ill.
2006) (discussing Justice Brennan’s article and referring to Justice Brennan’s “call to action”).
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may be located in a state constitution. Part I of this Article examines the
1970 Illinois Constitution, considering its structure and some of its
unique provisions. Part II of this Article explores how the Illinois
Supreme Court determined its method of interpreting the provisions of
the Illinois Constitution that have a federal constitutional counterpart.
And Part III of this Article looks at the application of this interpretative
paradigm as applied to some specific provisions of the Illinois
Constitution.
I. THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION OF 1970
Before turning to the way the Illinois Constitution is interpreted, it is
important to gain some background information regarding its provisions.
The 1970 Illinois Constitution is Illinois’ fourth constitution,15 and it is
comprised of fourteen articles.16 Unlike the Federal Constitution—where
most of the protections of individual rights are found in the amendments
that follow the initial constitutional text—the Illinois Constitution places
many of its individual guarantees at the front, in article I.17 The bill of
rights article contains twenty-five sections.18 Among other things, this
article provides for due process and equal protection;19 has separate
sections for religious freedom, freedom of speech, and the right to
assemble and petition for redress of grievances;20 provides extensive
15. Illinois’ initial constitution is from 1818, when the state joined the Union. Thereafter,
Illinois adopted a constitution in 1848, and one in 1870. For a discussion of those three
constitutions and the circumstances in which they were adopted, see ANN LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS
STATE CONSTITUTION—A REFERENCE GUIDE 3–21 (2010).
16. For further background on the historical context in which the 1970 constitutional convention
debates (and subsequent approval of the constitution) took place, see LOUSIN, supra note 15, at 17–
29.
17. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I. The constitution that the current document replaced, the Illinois
Constitution of 1870, placed its bill of rights in article II. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II. Many of the
provisions of the current bill of rights were copied verbatim, or else with minor changes, from the
1870 version. LOUSIN, supra note 15, at 40 (2010).
18. The first section of the Illinois Constitution’s bill of rights is the “inherent and inalienable
rights” clause. This clause, which has not been read to provide judicially enforceable rights, states:
“All men are by nature free and independent and have certain inherent and inalienable rights among
which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. To secure these rights and the protections of
property, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.” ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 1; see Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1056 (Ill.
1997) (finding that the inherent and inalienable rights clause does not provide judicially enforceable
rights). The Illinois Supreme Court has held that this provision “is not generally considered, of
itself, an operative constitutional limitation on governmental powers” and is not “an independent
source of constitutional law.” Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1056 (quoting GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN
G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 8
(1969)); see also LOUSIN, supra note 15, at 41–42 (discussing the inherent and inalienable rights
clause of the Illinois Constitution).
19. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 2.
20. Id. art. I, §§ 3–5. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution reads: “Congress
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protections for criminal defendants;21 prohibits ex post facto laws;22
grants a right to keep and bear arms;23 and provides for just compensation
for a public taking of private property.24 Article I also contains explicit
protections against discrimination “on the basis of race, color, creed,
national ancestry and sex” as well as on the basis of “physical or mental
handicap” in hiring and promotion practices or the sale or rental of
property.25 The Illinois bill of rights also broadly bans the denial of equal
protection of the laws on the basis of sex.26 In addition to these express
protections, article I also “condemns” communications that incite hatred
or violence toward a person by reference to religious, racial, ethnic,
national, or regional affiliation,27 and it reminds citizens to “recognize
their corresponding individual obligations and responsibilities.”28
The Illinois Constitution contains other individual rights and
protections throughout. For instance, in 2014, the Illinois voters amended
article III—which governs suffrage and elections—to prohibit voter
discrimination.29 Under that provision, no person shall be denied the
right to register to vote or to cast a ballot “based on race, color, ethnicity,
status as a member of a language minority, national origin, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, or income.”30 That constitutional amendment
demonstrates how society’s concern with different types of
discrimination has evolved over the last forty years from the concerns and
motivations of the framers and voters in 1970. While the protections
against discrimination based on race, ethnicity, and sex have remained
consistent over that time, this amended provision manifests an additional
concern with discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, which the
framers did not discuss at the 1970 constitutional convention.
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof;
or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I.
21. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 6–13.
22. Id. art. I, § 16.
23. Id. art. I, § 22.
24. Id. art. I, § 15.
25. Id. art. I, §§ 17, 19.
26. Id. art. I, § 18.
27. Id. art. I, § 20. The full text of the individual dignity clause reads: “To promote individual
dignity, communications that portray criminality, depravity or lack of virtue in, or that incite
violence, hatred, abuse or hostility toward, a person or group of persons by reason of or by reference
to religious, racial, ethnic, national or regional affiliation are condemned.” Id.
28. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 23. The fundamental principles clause states: “A frequent
recurrence to the fundamental principles of civil government is necessary to preserve the blessings
of liberty. These blessings cannot endure unless the people recognize their corresponding
individual obligations and responsibilities.” Id.
29. Id. art. III, § 8.
30. Id.
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Discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation was simply not on the
framers’ collective consciousness in 1970, but in the intervening years
social attitudes and understandings have changed dramatically. The
Illinois Constitution, at least in this specific instance, now expressly
reflects that social evolution.31 This illustrates that one element of a state
constitution’s unique vitality is that a state can more easily amend it to
adapt to changing local and societal concerns.
Two other examples of how the Illinois Constitution reflects its
citizens’ values that do not appear in the Federal Constitution are through
its provisions governing public education and the environment. With
regard to public education, the United States Supreme Court has “long
recognized that education is primarily a concern of local authorities.”32
Understanding that education is traditionally left to the states, article X
of the Illinois Constitution provides an explicit constitutional right to a
free public education.33 That article declares that “[a] fundamental goal
of the People of the State is the educational development of all persons
to the limits of their capacities,”34 and requires the State to “provide for
an efficient system of high quality public educational institutions and
services” that shall be free through the secondary level.35
Addressing another local matter that is not found in the Federal
Constitution,36 article XI of the Illinois Constitution is devoted to the
31. Another way that the Illinois Constitution has been amended since 1970 to reflect changing
societal values is the addition of the crime victim’s rights provision to the bill of rights in 1992 and
the amendment of that same provision in 2014. Id. art. I, § 8.1.
32. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 131 (1995).
33. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. X. The express constitutional right to a free public education first
appeared in the 1870 Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII. Illinois, however, did
statutorily provide for a general school system since 1845. See BRADEN & COHN, supra note 18,
at 399 (discussing article X of the Illinois Constitution and the State’s dedication to education).
34. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. X, § 1. In rejecting an argument that this clause imposed a duty on
boards of education to place students in special education classes, the Illinois Supreme Court
explained that this provision “is a statement of general philosophy, rather than a mandate that
certain means be provided in any specific form.” Pierce v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chi., 370 N.E.2d
535, 536 (Ill. 1977). This is not the only clause or provision of the Illinois Constitution to be
interpreted as a “statement of general philosophy” that does not confer judicially enforceable rights.
See, e.g., Schoeberlein v. Purdue Univ., 544 N.E.2d 283, 285 (Ill. 1989) (explaining that article I,
section 12, which provides that “[e]very person shall find a certain remedy for all injuries and
wrongs,” “merely expresses a philosophy, and does not mandate a certain remedy be provided in
any specific form”).
35. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. X, § 1. In Committee for Educational Rights v. Edgar, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected a claim that disparities in public education funding between school districts
violated the requirement that the State provide an “efficient” system of free public education. 672
N.E.2d 1178, 1184–88 (Ill. 1996). The court also held that whether the State fulfilled its
constitutional obligation to provide “high-quality” educational institutions was solely a legislative
matter beyond the competency of the judiciary. Id. at 1189–92.
36. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 828 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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environment.37 Similar to the education article, this article declares a
public policy, this time “to provide and maintain a healthful environment
for the benefit of this and future generations.”38 This article grants the
General Assembly the power to implement and enforce this guarantee
through enactment of laws,39 which the General Assembly has done in
the form of the Illinois Environmental Protection Act.40 The environment
article also provides that “[e]ach person has the right to a healthful
environment” and may enforce that right against any party “through
appropriate legal proceedings.”41
An additional feature of the Illinois Constitution is that it requires the
General Assembly to periodically present to the Illinois voters the
question of whether to call a new constitutional convention. Under that
article, three-fifths of the members of each house of the General
Assembly may call for the question of whether a constitutional
convention should be submitted to the voters.42 If the General Assembly
does not present the constitutional convention question to the voters for
a period of twenty years, the secretary of state must submit the question
to the voters.43 A constitutional convention must be called if approved
by three-fifths of those voting on the question or a majority of those
voting in the general election at which the question is presented.44
The 1970 Illinois Constitution, in many ways, is a progressive
document that reflects modern values and principles. And since it was
adopted by the Illinois voters, it has evolved through amendments as
modern society has changed. The Illinois Constitution thus continues to
embody the unique and changing set of values held by the citizens of this
state.
II. INTERPRETING THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN EVOLUTION TO THE
LIMITED LOCKSTEP DOCTRINE
Broadly speaking, there are three approaches to interpreting state
constitutional provisions that have a counterpart in the Federal
Constitution.45 First, is the primacy approach in which a state court
37. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XI. This article was new to the 1970 Illinois Constitution.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 415 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2 (2016).
41. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XI, § 2. This provision “does not create any new causes of action
but, rather, does away with the ‘special injury’ requirement typically employed in environmental
nuisance cases.” City of Elgin v. Cty. of Cook, 660 N.E.2d 875, 890 (Ill. 1996).
42. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. XIV, § 1(a).
43. Id. art. XIV, § 1(b).
44. Id. art. XIV, § 1(c).
45. This question is different than the interpretative principles or canons a court uses in deriving
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analyzes the issue under the state constitutional provision without resort
to federal law; and if a state court finds no violation of the state
constitution, only then does the court look to federal law to see if a federal
right has been violated.46 The second approach is the interstitial approach
in which the state court first examines the federal challenge and only
reaches the question under the state constitution if it finds no federal
violation. Under this approach, a state court “may diverge from federal
precedent for three reasons: a flawed federal analysis, structural
differences between state and federal government, or distinctive state
characteristics.”47 The third approach is the lockstep doctrine in which
“the state court binds itself to following prior Supreme Court
interpretation of the federal constitutional text.”48
The debate in Illinois courts over the proper way to interpret provisions
of the Illinois Constitution that have cognate provisions in the Federal
Constitution arose in the early 1980s in a series of criminal cases.49 This
debate was sparked when the United States Supreme Court changed the
Fourth Amendment’s standard for assessing the credibility of a
confidential informant used to support the request for a search warrant.
Since the 1960s, the question of whether a warrant was properly issued
based on information provided by a confidential informant was governed,
for Fourth Amendment purposes, by the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli
test.50 In People v. Gates, the Illinois Supreme Court was presented a
the meaning of a constitutional provision’s language. In Illinois, courts apply the same general
principles to construe constitutional provisions as statutory provisions, and the primary purpose is
to give effect to the “common understanding of the persons who adopted it—the citizens of this
state.” Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138, ¶ 16, 39 N.E.3d 982, 987. If the provision’s language
is unambiguous, the court will interpret it without resort to the drafting history, including the
constitutional convention debates. Id.; Kanerva v. Weems, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36, 13 N.E.1228,
1238; see Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶¶ 35–36, 63 N.E.3d 824, 834–37
(holding that a constitutional provision’s language should be interpreted by the intent of its plain
language). In construing the language of a constitutional provision, “it is proper to consider
constitutional language ‘in light of the history and condition of the times, and the particular problem
which the convention sought to address.’” Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, ¶ 36, 13 N.E.1228, 1238
(quoting Client Follow-Up Co. v. Hynes, 390 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ill. 1979) (internal ellipsis omitted).
46. People v. Caballes (Caballes II), 851 N.E.2d 26, 41–43 (Ill. 2006).
47. Id. at 41–42 (quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997)).
48. Id. at 41.
49. This debate arose shortly after Justice Brennan’s article was published. See generally
Brennan, supra note 8.
50. This test was derived from Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United
States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Under the test, the magistrate issuing a warrant must establish both
the confidential informant’s knowledge and the informant’s credibility. See Aguilar, 378 U.S. at
114 (“[T]he magistrate must be informed of some of the underlying circumstances from which the
informant concluded that the narcotics were where he claimed they were, and some of the
underlying circumstances from which the officer concluded that the informant, whose identity need
not be disclosed, was ‘credible’ or his information ‘reliable.’”).
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motion to quash a search warrant obtained on the basis of information
supplied by a confidential informant.51 Without elaboration, the court
noted that both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 6 of the
Illinois Constitution “provide assurance against unreasonable searches
and seizures of person and property.”52 The court then applied the
Aguilar-Spinelli test and held the warrant invalid.53
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently received another question
regarding whether there was probable cause to support a search warrant
in People v. Exline.54 But while Exline was pending, the United States
Supreme Court reversed the Gates decision and moved away from the
“rigid” Aguilar-Spinelli test to a totality-of-the circumstances analysis.55
One motivating concern for the Court was that the “strictures that
inevitably accompany the ‘two-pronged test’ cannot avoid seriously
impeding the task of law enforcement.”56 The Illinois Supreme Court in
Exline did not decide whether the new Gates test should be given
retroactive effect, for it determined that the challenged warrant survived
under either test.57 Justice Goldenhersh dissented, explaining that the
Aguilar-Spinelli test provided the better analysis and that it should be
retained as the test under article I, section 6 of the Illinois Constitution.58
Justice Goldenhersh’s comments are notable because the majority did not
reference any challenge under the Illinois Constitution,59 but he clearly
viewed the state constitution as a means to halt a trend in federal
constitutional jurisprudence that he did not favor.60
51. 423 N.E.2d 887 (Ill. 1981), rev’d, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
52. Id. at 889. The appellate court, by contrast, made no mention of article I, section 6 as it
framed the matter as arising solely under the Fourth Amendment. People v. Gates, 403 N.E.2d 77,
80–81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), aff’d, 423 N.E.2d 887 (Ill. 1981).
53. Gates, 423 N.E.2d at 890–93.
54. 456 N.E.2d 112 (Ill. 1983).
55. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983); see Exline, 456 N.E.2d at 114 (“Since this
case was taken under advisement, the United States Supreme Court rendered a decision in Illinois
v. Gates . . . , abandoning the frequently cited Aguilar-Spinelli test.”).
56. Gates, 462 U.S. at 237 (“If, as the Illinois Supreme Court apparently thought, that test must
be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value in police
work.”).
57. Exline, 456 N.E.2d at 114.
58. Id. at 116 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). Justice Simon joined this dissent.
59. In fact, the appellate court resolved the matter under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments
with no reference to article I, section 6, either. People v. Exline, 439 N.E.2d 1097, 1099 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1982), rev’d, 456 N.E.2d (Ill. 1983).
60. In Illinois v. Gates, Justice White concurred in the judgment and noted that the Illinois
Supreme Court had invalidated the warrant under both the federal and state constitutions. 462 U.S.
at 252 (White, J., concurring in judgment). He suggested that prudence dictated permitting the state
courts to consider in the first instance whether a “‘totality of the circumstances’ test should replace
the more precise rules of Aguilar and Spinelli.” Id. He continued: “The Illinois Supreme Court
may decide to retain the established test for purposes of its state constitution.” Id. The majority in
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The next year, the Illinois Supreme Court addressed a challenge that
the State’s implied consent law violated the Illinois constitutional
protection against self-incrimination.61 Under Illinois law, any person
driving on the public roads is deemed to have consented to a test to
determine the alcohol or drug content of that person’s blood in the event
of an arrest.62 The statute further provided that if a person who is arrested
refuses to submit to a test, evidence of the refusal is admissible in civil or
criminal proceedings against that person.63 The defendant in People v.
Rolfingsmeyer was arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol and
refused the test. He then challenged the implied consent law under the
self-incrimination provisions of the federal and state constitutions.64
In relevant part, the language of both constitutional provisions
regarding self-incrimination is very similar. The Fifth Amendment
provides that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself.”65 Article I, section 10 of the Illinois
Constitution provides: “No person shall be compelled in a criminal case
to give evidence against himself.”66 The majority first determined that
the implied consent law did not violate the Fifth Amendment under
current United States Supreme Court precedent.67 It then turned to the
challenge under the state constitution, and found no reason to depart from
the interpretation of the Fifth Amendment in interpreting article I, section
10 of the Illinois Constitution. The court explained that “[t]here is
nothing in the proceedings of the constitutional convention to indicate an
intention to provide, in article I, section 10, protections against selfincrimination broader than those of the Constitution of the United
States.”68
People v. Tisler pointed out Justice White’s language in Gates, but ultimately concluded that it
should follow the interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in construing article I, section 6 of the
Illinois Constitution. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147, 153–55 (Ill. 1984).
61. People v. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d 410 (Ill. 1984).
62. 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/11-501.1(a) (2016).
63. Id. at 5/11-501.1(c).
64. The defendant also raised a challenge, which the court rejected, under the separation-ofpowers provision of the Illinois Constitution. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d at 411–12. The Federal
Constitution does not include the words “separation of powers,” and the separation-of-powers
doctrine is a principle that has been read into the Constitution by the federal court. On the other
hand, the Illinois Constitution contains an explicit separation-of-powers provision: “The legislative,
executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise the powers properly
belonging to another.” ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. II, § 1.
65. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
66. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 10.
67. Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d at 412–13 (applying South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553
(1983)).
68. Id. at 412 (citing 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION, VERBATIM TRANSCRIPTS 1376–80 (1970) [hereinafter 3 RECORD OF
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Justice Simon in his special concurrence joined the debate on how to
interpret the Illinois Constitution. He viewed the majority as holding that
“we are bound to automatically follow the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court interpreting the comparable provision” of the Federal
Constitution.69 According to Justice Simon, the majority assumed that a
provision of the Illinois bill of rights has the same meaning as the
corresponding provision of the Federal Bill of Rights unless
constitutional convention proceedings indicate the contrary. That
presumption, he argued, “is the reverse of the correct one and inverts the
proper relationship between the [s]tate and [f]ederal constitutions.”70
Thus, Justice Simon found it significant that nothing in Illinois’
constitutional convention debate proceedings reflected an intention to
limit the scope of the Illinois provision to United States Supreme Court
precedents.71 Arguing that Illinois judges were not “frozen” by Supreme
Court interpretation of the Federal Bill of Rights, Justice Simon wrote
that “we, as the justices of the Illinois Supreme Court, are sovereign in
our own sphere; in construing the State Constitution we must answer to
our own consciences and rely upon our own wisdom and insights.”72
Soon thereafter, the Illinois Supreme Court was presented squarely
with the question of whether to apply Gates to a motion to quash a
warrant under article I, section 6, or whether to continue to apply AguilarSpinelli.73 The court, thus, was faced with the question of whether to
interpret the warrant clause of the Illinois Constitution in lockstep with
the Supreme Court’s understanding of the Fourth Amendment. In People
v. Tisler, the court first addressed the defendant’s argument that, as a
matter of state constitutional law, Aguilar-Spinelli should control because
the framers intended the Illinois Constitution to expand the protections
against unreasonable police conduct and the “more flexible” Gates test
undermined that protection.74 In rejecting this argument, the court relied
on a committee report to the constitutional convention which explained
that article I, section 6 was intended to provide new protections against
the use of eavesdropping devices and against invasions of privacy. 75 But
other proposals to change section 6 were rejected, so the language of “the
PROCEEDINGS]).
69. Id. at 413 (Simon, J., specially concurring).
70. Id.
71. Id. at 413–14.
72. Id. at 414–15. Justice Simon also referred to Justice Brandeis’s dissent in New State Ice Co.
v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932), for the proposition that states may serve as laboratories
trying “novel social and economic experiments.” Rolfingsmeyer, 461 N.E.2d at 413.
73. People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984).
74. Id. at 155.
75. Id.
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warrant clause with its probable-cause requirement, and the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure . . . remains nearly the same as
that of the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”76 The court also relied on the
explanatory material provided to the citizens voting on whether to adopt
the proposed constitution, which stated that the “restriction on warrants
is unchanged.”77 Therefore, the court found that the Fourth Amendment
was “the direct and lineal ancestor of the protection afforded by the
Illinois Constitution”78 and that both the state and federal constitutions
were “designed to protect against the same abuses.”79
The court explained that in the past it construed the state and federal
provisions to provide the same protection, such as when it applied
Aguilar-Spinelli to warrants based on informants’ information. But while
the court adopted the Aguilar-Spinelli test in those cases, it did not
establish the test “as defining the extent of the protection afforded by the
Illinois Constitution.”80 Instead, those cases applying Aguilar-Spinelli
simply stood for the proposition that the Illinois Constitution’s
protections are measured by the same standards as the Fourth
Amendment.81 The court had “accepted the pronouncements of the
Supreme Court in deciding [F]ourth [A]mendment cases as the
appropriate construction of the search and seizure provisions of the
Illinois Constitution for so many years,” and would not depart from that
lockstep interpretation to forestall what the defendant argued was a
narrowing of his civil rights.82
As such, the court set out its test for interpreting state constitutional
provisions that have an analogue in the United States Constitution. Under
this test, the presumption was that a court will afford a state constitutional
provision the same scope and interpretation as the federal version.83 To
depart from that lockstep interpretation, the court must find a meaningful
difference in the language of the state constitutional provision or
something in the constitutional convention debates and committee reports
76. Id. (citing 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
COMMITTEE PROPOSALS MEMBER PROPOSALS 29, 33 (1970) [hereinafter 6 RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS]).
77. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 155 (quoting 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE PROPOSALS MEMBER PROPOSALS 2683 (1969–70).
78. Id. (citing BRADEN & COHN, supra note 18, at 28).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 157.
83. Id. Earlier in the opinion, the Tisler majority acknowledged that “[s]ubject to the limitations
noted later, this court may construe these terms as contained in our constitution differently from
the construction the Supreme Court has placed on the same terms in the Federal Constitution.” Id.
at 156.
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indicating that the state provision should be given a different
interpretation.84
The debate between the justices over the proper method of interpreting
the Illinois Constitution played out over the various concurring and
dissenting opinions in Tisler. For example, Justice Ward wrote a
concurring opinion in which he noted “the developing interest in [s]tate
constitutionalism” and that “there appear statements showing less than a
full understanding of the character of constitutions and the principles that
guide their judicial interpretation.”85 He explained that “it is generally
accepted that courts must look to the intent of the adopters and framers
as controlling” when interpreting the constitution.86 To understand the
original intent of the constitution, Justice Ward relied not only on the
convention debates, but also the research papers given to the convention
delegates, concluding that the research papers “should not be overlooked
in any search to determine the mind of the convention.”87
Justice Clark specially concurred in the judgment, disagreeing with the
notion that the court had tied its interpretation of the Illinois Constitution
to the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal Constitution.88 He
believed the fact that the court had in the past relied on Supreme Court
precedent for guidance was not dispositive; instead, “[t]here [was]
nothing which prevent[ed] this court from interpreting our constitution as
affording greater protection than similar provisions of the Federal
Constitution.”89 Justice Clark found the majority’s position “dangerous”
because it would prevent the court from protecting civil liberties of
Illinois citizens in the event that the Supreme Court scaled back those
rights as a matter of federal law.90 He also highlighted a “tradition of
84. Id. at 157. The court went on to agree with the Supreme Court that the totality-of-thecircumstances test “will achieve a fairer balance between the relevant public and private interests”
that must be balanced in search and seizure cases and adopted the Gates test as a matter of Illinois
constitutional law. Id. Because the underlying events in Tisler occurred prior to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Gates, the defendant argued that Aguilar-Spinelli (which was the law at the time
of the arrest) should apply. Id. The court applied Supreme Court precedent to determine whether
Gates should be given retroactive effect as a matter of Illinois constitutional law, ultimately
concluding that Gates governed. Id. at 157–58.
85. Id. at 161 (Ward, J., concurring).
86. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d at 161 (discussing GEORGE BLUM ET AL., 16 AM. JUR. 2D
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 92, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2017)).
87. Id. at 161–63.
88. Id. at 163 (Clark, J., specially concurring).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 163–64. Justice Clark echoed the concerns raised by Justice Brennan in his article—
indeed, he cited the article—that the Warren Court’s expansion of civil rights, precipitated largely
because state courts were unwilling to provide those protections, had given way to the Burger
Court’s retrenchment of those rights. Id. at 164. Thus, in the Burger-Court era, “we have seen the
role of the State and Federal judiciary reversed.” Id.
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judicial independence” with a “long history in Illinois,”91 citing as
examples that the Illinois Supreme Court struck down public school
prayer fifty years before the Supreme Court92 and adopted the
exclusionary rule well before the Supreme Court held that it applied to
the states.93 This led Justice Clark to conclude that “the idea that the
Illinois Constitution is coextensive with the United States Constitution is
a recent theory without support in the prior decisions of this court.”94 To
Justice Clark, the constitution “is a living document” framed in general
terms to preserve “the flexibility to deal with unforeseen questions,” so
“the absence of certain comments at the Illinois constitutional convention
should not tie our hands.”95 The majority’s approach, he felt, amounted
to a “crushing degree of uniformity” that stifled the ability of the State to
control its affairs.96 Finally, Justice Goldenhersh, joined by Justice
Simon, dissented from the court’s holding that the evidence obtained on
the basis of the informant’s information should not be suppressed. The
dissenters nonetheless noted their agreement with Justice Clark’s view
about the manner in which the Illinois Constitution should be interpreted,
explaining that the court should not “blindly follow the action taken by
the Supreme Court in determining the standards applicable under our own
Constitution.”97
Shortly after the Tisler decision, the United States Supreme Court in
Moran v. Burbine confronted the issue of whether an individual’s
constitutional rights were violated when, while in custody, police did not
inform that individual of his counsel’s attempts to reach him.98 In
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); People ex rel. Ring v. Bd. of Educ., 92 N.E.
251 (Ill. 1910)).
93. Id. (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Brocamp, 138 N.E. 728 (Ill. 1923)).
94. Id. Among other things, Justice Clark disagreed with the majority’s understanding of
People v. Tillman. Id. at 164–65; People v. Tilman, 116 N.E.2d 344 (Ill. 1953). The majority cited
Tillman for the proposition that the language of the Fourth Amendment and the Illinois Constitution
were “in effect the same” and so should be construed the same. Id. at 156 (quoting Tillman, 116
N.E.2d at 346–47). Justice Clark, however, relied a different part of the quoted passage from
Tillman which stated that the two constitutions, with the essentially similar language, “should be
construed in favor of the accused.” Id. at 164–65 (quoting Tillman, 116 N.E.2d at 346–47).
95. Id. Justice Clark also explained that for years, the Federal Bill of Rights only protected
citizens against abuses by the federal government, and the state constitutions protected the people
from state authorities. While most of the protections of the Federal Constitution have been
incorporated as applicable against the local governments, “[t]he [s]tates in our federal system . . .
remain the primary guardian of liberty of the people.” Id. at 165.
96. Id. at 166 (citing New State Ice Co., v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
97. Id. (Golderhersh, J., dissenting) (quoting his dissent in People v. Exline, 456 N.E.2d 112,
116 (Ill. 1983)).
98. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 415–16 (1986).
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Burbine, the Court held that an individual’s waiver of his right to remain
silent and to the presence of counsel was valid even though police did not
inform him that counsel was trying to contact him. 99 The Court noted
that the individual’s waiver was not coerced and reasoned that events
about which he had no knowledge could not affect his capacity to validly
waive his rights.100 As a result, statements made by the individual
without the presence of counsel were admissible against him in a criminal
proceeding.101 In reaching this decision, the Court noted that “a number
of state courts have reached a contrary conclusion” while applying federal
law, but stated that its holding does not prevent a state “from adopting
different requirements for the conduct of its employees and officials as a
matter of state law.”102
The Burbine Court’s express acknowledgement that states may choose
to adopt a different rule as a matter of state law prophesied subsequent
decisions in Illinois. Understandably, defense counsel would recognize
that though Burbine may foreclose a suppression motion as a matter of
federal law, that same federal decision also explicitly mentioned the
possibility of different rules under state law. Eight years later, in People
v. McCauley, the Illinois Supreme Court considered an appeal from a trial
court’s decision to suppress statements made by a defendant after an
attorney was present at the police station, but was not allowed to consult
with the defendant.103 The Illinois Supreme Court found that Burbine
was dispositive of the Fifth Amendment claim, which therefore had to be
rejected as legally groundless.104
The court, however, found that the statements must be suppressed as a
matter of Illinois constitutional jurisprudence: “The day is long past in
Illinois, however, where attorneys must shout legal advice to their clients,
held in custody, through the jailhouse door. In this case, we determine
that our [s]tate constitutional guarantees afforded defendant a greater
protection.”105 In reaching this determination, the court relied not only
on the Illinois protection against self-incrimination,106 but also on the
99. Id. at 421.
100. Id. at 421–23.
101. Id. at 421.
102. Id. at 427–28.
103. 645 N.E.2d 923 (Ill. 1994).
104. Id. at 929. (“[Moran v. Burbine] is controlling here in terms of any [f]ederal constitutional
basis for suppressing defendant’s statements. Defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel was
therefore valid and suppression of defendant’s statements was insupportable on [F]ifth
[A]mendment grounds.”).
105. Id.
106. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 10 (“No person shall be compelled in a criminal case to give
evidence against himself . . . .”).
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state constitutional guarantee of due process.107
In departing from the federal self-incrimination standard, the court
relied on three of its prior decisions108 and the constitutional convention
proceedings.109 This authority, the court found, demonstrated that the
protections of article I, section 10 of the Illinois Constitution “differ
substantially” from the Federal Constitution and that the contrary, preBurbine rule the Illinois court set forth in People v. Smith remains the law
in Illinois “[r]egardless of the United States Supreme Court’s current
views on waiver of the right to counsel under the Federal
Constitution.”110
With regard to the constitutional convention
proceedings, the court found that the delegates intended to incorporate
then-existing federal law into the Illinois Constitution.111 The court
based this conclusion in part on Delegate Weisberg’s statement that the
bill of rights committee intended “that the existing state of the law would
remain unchanged” under article I, section 10.112 Additionally, the
essays and materials provided to the delegates described recent federal
precedent and argued for the importance of retaining the language from
the former constitution.113
Justice Bilandic disagreed, writing that none of the past Illinois
decisions held that article I, section 10 is to be interpreted more broadly

107. Id. art. I, § 2 (“No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process
of law nor be denied the equal protection of the laws.”).
108. One of the three decisions, People v. Smith, predated Burbine. 442 N.E.2d 1325 (Ill. 1982).
The other two, People v. Holland and People v. Griggs, were concerned with the application of
Burbine, or more specifically whether to distinguish Burbine or Smith. People v. Griggs, 604
N.E.2d 257 (Ill. 1992); People v. Holland, 520 N.E.2d 270 (Ill. 1987).
109. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 929–30.
110. Id. at 930. The court quoted Smith’s rule as
when police, prior to or during custodial interrogation, refuse an attorney appointed or
retained to assist a suspect access to the suspect, there can be no knowing waiver of the
right to counsel if the suspect has not been informed that the attorney was present and
seeking to consult with him.
Id. (quoting Smith, 422 N.E.2d at 1329). Smith was decided as a matter of federal constitutional
law under the Fifth Amendment, not as a matter of Illinois constitutional law under article I, section
10. See Smith, 422 N.E.2d at 1327 (“We consider, however, that the statements should have been
suppressed. We rest that conclusion upon the defendant’s right to counsel during custodial
interrogation. That right stems from the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination.”).
111. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 936–37.
112. Id. That delegate, Bernard Weisberg, had recently represented the American Civil
Liberties Union as amicus curiae in Escobedo v. State of Illinois, which held that the police’s refusal
to honor a request to consult with a lawyer during an interrogation violated the Sixth Amendment.
378 U.S. 478, 495–98 (1964). The court in People v. McCauley found that the delegates were
aware of the constitutional interpretations in Escobedo and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 936–37.
113. Id.
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than the Fifth Amendment.114 Moreover, he wrote that nothing in the text
of the Illinois Constitution supports a broader reading, as the language of
the two provisions is almost identical.115 Instead, the Illinois Supreme
Court had previously held that the “two provisions differ in semantics
rather than in substance and have received the same general
construction.”116 Additionally, no evidence in the committee reports or
debates stated that a court should give article I, section 10 a broader
interpretation than the Fifth Amendment, and Delegate Weisberg’s
statements also did not manifest an intent to constitutionalize thenexisting federal precedent.117 Justice Miller agreed with Justice Bilandic,
asserting that the Illinois cases that the majority relied on to support a
broader state constitutional right “did not purport to rely on or apply the
Illinois Constitution.”118
Turning to a separate due process analysis, the McCauley majority
noted that it “has not consistently applied the so-called lockstep doctrine
as an assist in interpreting” the due process clause, and instead “has
expressly asserted its independence in interpreting this particular
provision of our constitution.”119 The court examined Illinois case law
and past statutes and determined that an accused person has the right to
consult with an attorney and public officers have a duty to permit counsel
to consult with persons in custody.120 Justice Miller took issue with this
analysis, referring to it as “a Miranda analysis viewed through a due
process lens” and arguing that the old statutes the majority relied on are
“not provisions of a constitution, and are of little, if any, assistance to the

114. Id. at 941 (Bilandic, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
115. Id. at 942.
116. Id. (quoting People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power, 295 N.E.2d 472, 475 (Ill. 1973)). The court
in People ex rel. Hanrahan v. Power essentially applied a lockstep interpretation of the state
constitution. Justice Goldenhersh dissented, arguing that the conduct violated both the federal
constitution and the state constitution, “which in my opinion impose[s] higher standards.” Power,
295 N.E.2d at 476 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting).
117. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 942–43.
118. Id. at 944–45 (Miller, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
119. Id. at 937 (citing Rollins v. Elwood, 565 N.E.2d 1302, 1316 (Ill. 1990)). Rollins v. Elwood
involved, in part, an action to quash service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The question raised
was whether application of Illinois’ long-arm statute violated the party’s right to due process. The
court explained that the Illinois Constitution’s due process guarantee “stands separate and
independent from the [f]ederal guarantee of due process.” Elwood, 565 N.E.2d at 1316.
120. McCauley, 645 N.E.2d at 937–38 (“Considering these facts and principles, it is clear that
the constitutional and statutory policies of our State favor a person having the assistance of counsel
during custodial interrogation and contemplate prohibiting interference with that assistance by
governmental authorities.”). As far back as 1874, Illinois had a statute that required public officers
holding custody of a person to “admit any practicing attorney” whom the person desired to consult
to see and consult with the person. Id. at 938 (quoting ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, par. 229 (1874)).
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resolution of the constitutional question posed here.”121
The hybrid nature of the McCauley decision, resting equally on the
Illinois constitutional protection against self-incrimination and its
guarantee of due process, thus used two state constitutional provisions to
provide greater constitutional protections than available under the Fifth
Amendment. As seen, however, the justices vigorously debated whether
the majority’s approach was consistent with the analytical method set
forth by Tisler. Nonetheless, several years later, a unanimous Illinois
Supreme Court explained that McCauley “represents this court’s refusal
to allow this state’s counterpart to the [F]ifth [A]mendment right to
counsel to diminish the way the federal right had in Burbine.”122
In 1996, the Illinois Supreme Court departed from lockstep in two
criminal cases, though each case invoked different constitutional rights.
First, in People v. Washington, the court examined whether a “freestanding claim of innocence” presented a constitutional question.123 In
that case, a criminal defendant sought to raise new evidence that
established his innocence many years after he was convicted.124 Because
this claim did not assert a constitutional violation with respect to his trial,
it was a free-standing claim of innocence.125 But because so much time
had elapsed since his trial, the only vehicle for the defendant to raise the
claim was under Illinois’ Post-Conviction Hearing Act.126 That statute
was limited to constitutional claims, so to raise his new innocence claim,
the defendant needed a constitutional basis for the argument.127 The
court first found that the defendant did not have a federal constitutional
due process right to raise a free-standing claim of innocence.128 Turning
to the Illinois Constitution, however, the court found both a procedural
and a substantive due process right to raise the innocence claim.129 Citing
McCauley for the principle that the court “labor[s] under no self-imposed
constraint to follow federal precedent in ‘lockstep’” when interpreting the
state due process clause, the court found that to ignore the defendant’s
121. Id. at 945.
122. Relsolelo v. Fisk, 760 N.E.2d 963, 968–69 (Ill. 2001). The court also characterized
McCauley as “stay[ing] true to the path begun in Miranda and Escobedo.” Id.; see People v. Hunt,
2012 IL 111089, ¶ 56, 969 N.E.2d 819, 829 (Freeman, J., concurring) (explaining that the court’s
decision does not undermine the holding in McCauley, stating that the “force and effect of
McCauley remains unchanged”).
123. People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330 (Ill. 1996).
124. Id. at 1331.
125. Id. at 1332.
126. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (1998) (providing the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
127. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1332–33; see also 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/122-1 (1998)
(providing the Post-Conviction Hearing Act).
128. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1332–35 (relying on Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993)).
129. Id. at 1335–37.
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claim would be “fundamentally unfair”130 and would shock the
conscience so as to “trigger operation of substantive due process.”131
Once again, the justices debated the proper method for interpreting the
state constitution in the concurring and dissenting opinions. Justice
McMorrow wrote a separate concurrence to explain that, in her view, the
majority did not need to address the question of whether the defendant
had a federal due process right.132 Instead, the court should have
considered only the state constitutional right.133 Justice Miller, joined by
Chief Justice Bilandic, dissented and reasoned that the majority failed to
explain why the Illinois Constitution should be interpreted differently
than its federal counterpart.134 The dissenters wrote that the court should
continue to adhere to the Tisler test, and that no rationale to support
deviation from lockstep existed because the language of the state and
federal constitutional provisions is the same and nothing in the
constitutional convention debates suggests that the drafters intended the
Illinois due process right to mean something different than the federal
right.135
Second, the Illinois Supreme Court seemingly departed from lockstep
in a search-and-seizure case under article I, section 6 of the Illinois
Constitution.136 In People v. Krueger, a defendant sought to suppress
evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued under an Illinois statute that
authorized a no-knock search.137 The court began its analysis by
examining the constitutionality of the no-knock statute under both state
and federal law. The court explained that the language of the search-andseizure clause of the Fourth Amendment was “nearly identical” to article
I, section 6 and it would “measure [defendant’s] constitutional
130. Id. at 1335–36.
131. Id. at 1336. The court subsequently reaffirmed its commitment to the more protective
interpretation of the Illinois right to substantive due process when it comes to actual innocence
claims in People v. Coleman, describing the court’s commitment to People v. Washington as
“unwavering.” 2013 IL 113307, ¶ 93, 996 N.E.2d 617, 627.
132. Washington, 665 N.E.2d at 1337 (McMorrow, J., specially concurring).
133. Id. at 1338.
134. Id. at 1341–42 (Miller, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. People v. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d 604 (Ill. 1996). The Illinois Supreme Court in People v.
Caballes (“Caballes II”) stated that it did not consider People v. Krueger to be a departure from
lockstep interpretation of the constitutional provisions, but rather a decision to apply a different
remedy for a constitutional violation. People v. Caballes (Caballes II), 851 N.E.2d 26, 38–39 (Ill.
2006). See People v. Bolden, 756 N.E.2d. 812, 825–26 (Ill. 2001) (“We do not construe Krueger
as suggesting that the search and seizure clause of article I, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution
must be interpreted more expansively than the corresponding right found in the fourth amendment.
The exclusionary rule is a judicially created remedy, and its history in Illinois may be traced to this
court’s decision in People v. Brocamp, 307 Ill. 448, 138 N.E. 728 (1923).”).
137. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 607.
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protections under both using the same standard.”138 The court
subsequently found that the statute violated both constitutions.
The question then became whether a good-faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, previously recognized by the United States Supreme
Court, applied to allow admission of the evidence against the defendant.
In Illinois v. Krull, the United States Supreme Court found that the Fourth
Amendment did not bar the use of evidence obtained by a police officer
who reasonably relied in good faith on a statute that authorized a
warrantless search but which statute was later found to be
unconstitutional.139 The Illinois Supreme Court in Krueger, however,
declined to apply the Krull rule as a matter of state law because it did not
“comport with” article I, section 6.140 The court based its departure from
lockstep on the long history in Illinois of suppressing evidence gathered
in violation of the state constitution’s prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The court concluded that “to adopt Krull’s
extended good-faith exception would drastically change this state’s
constitutional law.”141 The court also explained that it was “obliged to
evaluate the rationale underlying Krull” in determining whether to apply
it to the state constitution.142 The court held that the rule provided a grace
period for unconstitutional search-and-seizure legislation that imposed
too high a price on the State’s citizens.143 As in Washington, Justice
Miller dissented on the ground that the court’s rationale for departing
from lockstep did not satisfy the Tisler test.144
The Illinois Supreme Court restated its methodology for interpreting
the state constitution in People v. Caballes (“Caballes II”).145 Caballes
II came to the court on remand from the United States Supreme Court.146
The Illinois Supreme Court’s original decision in People v. Caballes
138. Id. (citing People v. Tisler, 469 N.E.2d 147 (Ill. 1984)).
139. 480 U.S. 340, 343 (1987).
140. Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 614.
141. Id. at 619.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 619–20.
144. Id. at 621–22 (Miller, J., dissenting). Justice Miller wrote that “the majority does not point
to anything in either the text or history of our state constitution that would warrant this court
reaching a result different from the one reached by the United States Supreme Court in [Illinois v.
Krull].” Krueger, 675 N.E.2d at 621. He continued: “Just as the majority follows federal law in
evaluating the validity of the statute under both the federal and state constitutions, so too should
we follow federal law in applying the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.” Id. at 622.
According to Justice Miller, following lockstep for the interpretation of article I, section 6 to
determine the constitutionality of the statute but not the exclusionary rule was “incongruous[ ].”
Id.
145. 851 N.E.2d 26 (Ill. 2006).
146. Caballes II, 851 N.E.2d at 29.
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(“Caballes I”) found that a canine stiff during a routine traffic stop
violated the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights because it
unjustifiably expanded the scope of that stop. 147 The United States
Supreme Court reversed that decision as a matter of the Federal
Constitution.148 On remand, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the
defendant had also challenged his conviction under article I, section 6 of
the Illinois Constitution, and addressed the question of whether to apply
the United States Supreme Court’s holding reversing Caballes I to the
interpretation of the state constitution.149
The Illinois Supreme Court explained that the lockstep doctrine “has
deep roots in Illinois and was firmly in place before the adoption of the
1970 constitution.”150 Furthermore, the drafters of article I of the 1970
Constitution, the convention delegates, and the voters who approved the
constitution were aware that Illinois courts traditionally interpreted the
state constitution in the same manner as its federal counterpart, at least
with regard to Fourth Amendment questions.151 After considering the
different approaches to interpreting cognate provisions of state and
federal constitutions and the court’s history of constitutional
interpretation since Tisler, the court found “that it is an overstatement to
147. People v. Caballes (Caballes I), 802 N.E.2d 202 (Ill. 2003). The majority in Caballes II
explained that it did not expressly state that it was conducting its analysis in People v. Caballes
(Caballes I) under only the Fourth Amendment, but it implicitly relied on Fourth Amendment cases
and did not expressly consider the argument raised under the Illinois Constitution. Caballes II, 851
N.E.2d at 34. The issue of whether a state court decision rests on federal law alone, state law alone,
or both federal and state law frequently is difficult to resolve. The matter is of jurisdictional
significance to the Supreme Court, for it has the power only to review decisions of federal law. In
recognition of the often murky basis for a state court decision, especially where both federal and
state constitutional claims are raised but addressed in a single analysis, the Court adopted a rule
whereby it will presume its jurisdiction to consider a decision in which the state court relied on
both federal and state precedent unless the state court “make[s] clear by a plain statement” that it
relied on federal precedence as guidance only and the court “indicates clearly and expressly that
[the decision] is alternatively based on bona fide separate, adequate, and independent grounds” of
state law. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983). An example of such a statement that a
decision rests on independent state law grounds is People v. Duncan. 530 N.E.2d 423, 428 (1988);
see People v. Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d 556, 577–78 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (Heiple, J., specially
concurring) (expressing that the majority should have made the Michigan v. Long statement and its
failure to do so “places the rights of Illinois citizens in the hands of the federal judiciary.”)
According to Justice Heiple, “[t]he responsible approach in this and other similar cases is to
preclude federal review of the issue in question by clearly basing our holding on the Illinois
Constitution.” Brownlee, 713 N.E.2d at 579.
148. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 425–25 (2005).
149. Caballes II, 851 N.E.2d at 32.
150. Id. at 39. In support, the court cited a series of search-and-seizure cases in which it applied
Fourth Amendment law to questions raised under the Illinois Constitution, including Tillman,
which was a focus of the debate between the justices in Tisler more than two decades before. Id.
at 38–39.
151. Id. at 39.
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describe our approach as being in strict lockstep with the Supreme
Court.”152 Instead, the court explained that it applies a “limited lockstep
approach.”153 Relying in part on the doctrine of stare decisis, the court
then reaffirmed its “commitment to limited lockstep analysis.”154 The
limited lockstep approach, the court wrote, “continues to reflect our
understanding of the intent of the framers of the Illinois Constitution of
1970.”155 Moreover, the court’s “jurisprudence of state constitutional
law cannot be predicated upon trends in legal scholarship, the actions of
our sister states, a desire to bring about a change in the law, or a sense of
deference to the nation’s highest court.”156 Instead, “our choice of a rule
of decision on matters governed by both the state and federal
constitutions has always been and must continue to be predicated on our
best assessment of the intent of the drafters, the delegates, and the
voters—this is our solemn obligation.”157
The court then explained that Tisler represented a limited lockstep
approach that was “modified” in Krueger and Washington “to allow
consideration of state tradition and values as reflected by long-standing
state case precedent.”158 The court thus will interpret a provision of the
Illinois Constitution in the same manner that the United States Supreme
Court interprets a similar provision of the Federal Constitution unless
there is: (1) a relevant difference in the language of the Illinois provision;
(2) support in the Illinois constitutional convention debates that a
different interpretation was intended; (3) evidence in the reports
considered by the convention delegates or materials submitted to the
voters favoring a different interpretation; or (4) a long-standing policy or
precedent in Illinois establishing a different interpretation.
Justice Freeman, joined by Justices McMorrow and Kilbride, dissented
in Caballes II. With regard to the question of interpreting similar
provisions of the state and federal constitutions, Justice Freeman wrote
that Illinois’ method is best characterized as the interstitial approach
because the reasons why the court has in the past departed from a lockstep
interpretation are the reasons “commonly associated with this approach”:
“[A] flawed federal analysis, structural differences between state and
federal government, or distinctive state characteristics.”159
He
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 61.
Id. at 84 (Freeman, J., dissenting) (quoting State v. Gomez, 932 P.2d 1, 7 (N.M. 1997)).
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considered Krueger to be an example where the Illinois Supreme Court
departed from lockstep because the United States Supreme Court’s
reasoning was wrong and described Washington as an example where
“the differences between the state and federal systems” justified the
Illinois Supreme Court’s departure from lockstep.160
As seen, the evolution of the court’s test for interpreting the state
constitution reflects the concerns and benefits that underlie each of the
different theoretical interpretative approaches. At some point in this
evolution, the justices wrote a defense of each approach. Tracing the
development of the court’s methodology to arrive at the limited lockstep
doctrine in Caballes II thus not only shows the different theories in a
practical context of deciding important constitutional issues, but also
showcases the development of important substantive constitutional
doctrines in the last few decades.
The Illinois Supreme Court has had the opportunity to apply its
interpretative approach in several different areas of constitutional
jurisprudence, and Part III examines some of those areas.
III. ILLINOIS’ APPLICATION OF THE LIMITED LOCKSTEP APPROACH IN
DIFFERENT AREAS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
A. Confrontation Clause Jurisprudence: A Lesson in the Implications of
the Limited Lockstep Approach
The confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution provides a
fascinating study. When the 1970 Illinois Constitution was adopted, the
bill of rights provided: “In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have
the right . . . to meet witnesses face to face.”161 The Illinois Supreme
Court had occasion to interpret that provision in comparison to the
interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court to the Sixth
Amendment’s Confrontation Clause in People v. Fitzpatrick.162 At issue
was the constitutionality of the Child Shield Act, which applied to
prosecutions for certain sex crimes and allowed the prosecution to present
the testimony of a minor victim from outside the courtroom and show it
in the courtroom via a closed-circuit television.163 The defendant
claimed that the Child Shield Act violated his confrontation rights under
160. Id. The dissent went on to conclude that the Supreme Court’s decision in Caballes I was
flawed, so the court should depart from lockstep. Id. at 84–85.
161. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 8. This language was identical to the language of the 1870
Illinois Constitution. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II, § 9.
162. 633 N.E.2d 685 (Ill. 1994).
163. Id. at 688; 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/106B-1, repealed by Pub. Act 88-674, § 5 (1994)
(codifying the Child Shield Law).
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the Illinois Constitution,164 while the State argued that the court should
afford the Illinois Constitution’s confrontation clause the same
interpretation as its federal counterpart.165 The State argued that, though
the language of the constitutions was different, the “essence” of the two
clauses was the same and guaranteed a defendant’s right to confront
witnesses through vigorous cross examination.166 Further, the United
States Supreme Court in Maryland v. Craig upheld a similar child shield
law as a matter of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.167 In Craig, the
United States Supreme Court held that while the right to confront
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment preferred face-to-face
confrontations, that preference was subject to exceptions.168
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, did not recognize any
exceptions to the state constitutional provision. The court explained that
it was bound to apply the plain meaning of the unambiguous language of
article I, section 8.169 The explicit constitutional language granting a
right “to meet the witnesses face to face” “confers an express and
unqualified right to a face-to-face confrontation with witnesses.”170
Because testimony by closed-circuit television was not face-to-face, the
Illinois Supreme Court found the statute unconstitutional.171 In reaching
this decision, the court noted that because the language of article I, section
8 was “clear and unambiguous,” the court “need not refer to the
constitutional debates, but must enforce the constitutional provision as
enacted.”172 The court distinguished Craig—and thus departed from
lockstep interpretation of the two provisions—based on the different
language used in the Sixth Amendment, which granted an accused the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him,” and did not
explicitly require a “face-to-face” confrontation, as did article I, section
8.173
Justice Freeman, joined by Justice Miller, dissented and argued that
the two constitutional provisions conveyed the same meaning.174 The
dissent asserted that courts read the Sixth Amendment to require a face-

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 689.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id. at 690–91 (citing Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990)).
Craig, 497 U.S. at 849.
Fitzpatrick, 633 N.E.2d at 689–90.
Id. at 690.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 692.
Id. at 693–94 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
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to-face confrontation, but have not held that right to be absolute.175
Therefore, the dissent concluded that the same rule should apply in
Illinois, especially where the court had previously held that “despite the
language difference, the two clauses are meant to protect the same
interest.”176
The reaction to Fitzpatrick was quick: the Illinois General Assembly
proposed a constitutional amendment intended to reverse the decision and
the voters approved that amendment in November of the same year.177
After the amendment, the confrontation clause now reads that the accused
shall have the right “to be confronted with witnesses against him or
her.”178 The Illinois Supreme Court explained that the amendment
“conform[s] this state’s confrontation clause to that of the [S]ixth
[A]mendment of the United States Constitution.”179 In construing this
“conforming” language, the court reads the two provisions in lockstep,
acknowledging that “although the confrontation clause generally requires
face-to-face confrontation, the requirement is not absolute.”180
The recent history of the Illinois confrontation clause demonstrates
some of the themes underlying state constitutional jurisprudence. First,
the Illinois Supreme Court was tasked with interpreting the state
constitutional language in light of the federal court’s interpretation of a
cognate provision. Indeed, given the Supreme Court’s decision in Craig,
it appears the defendant in Fitzpatrick made a wise tactical decision to
press a challenge only under the Illinois Constitution in hopes that the
court would depart from lockstep (which it did). Second, the reaction to
Fitzpatrick shows the relative ease and speed by which a state
constitution can be amended as compared to its federal counterpart: the
language of the confrontation clause was amended less than nine months
after the Illinois Supreme Court’s decision. This is an example of how
state constitutions are more readily adapted to the values and interests of
the State’s residents, which tend to be more homogenous than the values
across the fifty states that are under the rubric of the Federal Constitution.

175. Id. at 697.
176. Id. at 695 (quoting People v. Tennant, 358 N.E.2d 1116, 1123 (Ill. 1976)).
177. See People v. Dean, 677 N.E.2d 947, 957 (Ill. 1997) (holding that the constitutional
amendment deleting the “face-to-face” language from confrontation clause did not apply
retroactively).
178. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 8 (as amended Nov. 8, 1994).
179. People v. Lofton, 740 N.E.2d 782, 790 (Ill. 2000).
180. Id. at 793–94.
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B. The Varied Protections of Article I, Section 6 and Their Equally
Varied Interpretations
As discussed, the search-and-seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution
has given rise to the benchmark cases, Tisler and Caballes II, where the
Illinois Supreme Court has taken the opportunity to elucidate the standard
for interpreting state constitutional provisions that have a federal
analogue. As with other provisions, article I, section 6 provides several
different rights. It is not only a protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures; its title suggests its broader scope: “Searches, Seizures,
Privacy and Interception.”181 Courts may interpret some of the rights
within this provision in lockstep,182 but afford other rights a more
expansive reading.183 Still other rights may have no analogue in the
Federal Constitution, so they are given their own independent meaning
out of necessity.184 By contrast, the Fourth Amendment expressly
protects against unreasonable searches and seizures, but does not use the
word “privacy,” though that term has been read into the amendment by
the federal courts, or “interceptions.”185 As in Tisler and Caballes II,
where the reasonableness of a search and seizure is concerned, the court
will generally interpret the Illinois Constitution in line with the federal
counterpart.186
But there is support in Illinois law for the proposition that when the
privacy clause of article I, section 6 is invoked, Illinois courts will read
that provision more expansively than the privacy right that is read into
the Fourth Amendment.187 The constitutional commentary on this
181. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 6.
182. “This court interprets the search and seizure clause of the Illinois Constitution in limited
lockstep with its federal counterpart.” People v. LeFlore, 2015 IL 116799, ¶ 16, 372 N.E.3d 1043,
1047 (internal quotation marks omitted).
183. As discussed below, this is true of the explicit privacy right in article I, section 6. See
generally Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047 (Ill. 1997) (finding that an expansive reading was
appropriate).
184. For instance, there is no federal constitutional right analogous to the article I, section 6
prohibition on “interceptions of communications by eavesdropping devices or other means.” ILL.
CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 6; see People v. Porcelli, 323 N.E.2d 1, 3–4 (Ill App. Ct. 1975) (explaining
that the use of an eavesdropping device is a criminal offense).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347, 349 (1967) (explaining that Fourth
Amendment protects “individual privacy against certain kinds of governmental intrusions”).
186. People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 28, 986 N.E.2d 1163, 1170 (discussing Tisler and
Caballes II); see People v. Mitchell, 650 N.E.2d 1014, 1018 (Ill. 1995) (finding “the express intent
of the drafters to leave unaltered the search and seizure clause of section 6, the additional language
of section 6 provides no basis for an interpretation different from the Federal search and seizure
clause”); People v. Walker, 2013 IL App (4th) 120118, ¶ 32, 995 N.E.2d 35, 359 (“The search and
seizure provisions of the Illinois Constitution are interpreted in limited lockstep with the [F]ourth
[A]mendment to the United States Constitution.”).
187. People v. Nesbitt, 938 N.E.2d 600, 604 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010); see Katz, 389 U.S. at 350
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section provided that the “protection against ‘invasion of privacy’ is new
and is stated broadly.”188 Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court has
held that “the Illinois Constitution goes beyond [f]ederal constitutional
guarantees by expressly recognizing a zone of personal privacy” 189 that
is “stated broadly and without restrictions.”190 The privacy protection
may extend to “noninvasive physical evidence, such as fingerprints, voice
exemplars, and handwriting samples” or certain medical or financial
records.191 For example, a grand jury request for noninvasive physical
evidence such as a palm print did not raise a Fourth Amendment issue,
but did implicate the broader privacy protection of the state
constitution.192 Additionally, the privacy right extends to personal
medical information.193
Giving some clarity to the scope of the zone-of-personal-privacy
protection, the Illinois Supreme Court in Caballes II rejected the
argument that a dog sniff during a traffic stop implicated this right.194
The court explained that the dog sniff “will not reveal the contents of
diaries or love letters; it will not reveal the individual’s choice of reading
materials, whether religious, political, or pornographic; it will not reveal
sexual orientation or marital infidelity.”195 Because the dog sniff in
Caballes II did not implicate this privacy protection, it was to be analyzed
under the search-and-seizure analysis under which the lockstep approach
would be used.196
In another instance regarding the scope of one’s privacy right, the court
found that a requirement that a minor notify an adult before she obtains
an abortion did “interfere with the minor’s right to keep medical
information confidential,” but concluded that the statute’s interference
with the minor’s privacy right was not unreasonable.197 This decision
(explaining that the Fourth Amendment “protects individual privacy against certain kinds of
governmental intrusion” but “cannot be translated into a general constitutional ‘right to privacy’”).
188. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 6 (constitutional commentary).
189. In re May 1991 Will Cty. Grand Jury, 604 N.E.2d 929, 934–35 (Ill. 1992). The court also
stated that the privacy protection “is stated broadly and without restrictions.” Id.
190. Kunkel v. Walton, 689 N.E.2d 1047, 1055 (Ill. 1997).
191. Caballes II, 851 N.E.2d at 53–54.
192. In re May 1991, 604 N.E.2d at 934–35; see People v. Boston, 2016 IL 118661, ¶¶ 23–25,
43 N.E.3d 859, 863–64 (discussing In re May 1991 Will County Grand Jury).
193. Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1055–56. Where the right to privacy is implicated, the challenged
action will be invalidated only if the invasion is unreasonable. See Burger v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
759 N.E.2d 533, 553–54 (Ill. 2001) (finding that only unreasonable invasions of privacy are
constitutionally forbidden). The court applies the same test that it would to determine the
reasonableness of a search and seizure under article I, section 4. Kunkel, 689 N.E.2d at 1055–56.
194. Caballes II, 851 N.E.2d at 54.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 32–46.
197. Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores, 2013 IL 112673, ¶¶ 63–68, 991 N.E.2d 745, 761–
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reinforces the constitutional rule that only unreasonable invasions of
privacy are prohibited, not all invasions of privacy.
The development of the jurisprudence on the Illinois Constitution’s
express privacy right has established a new right unknown in the Federal
Constitution that offers significant protection. But that right is not
unbounded either in scope or degree. Therefore, while an Illinois citizen
has a constitutional right to privacy in certain physical, medical, financial,
or personal information, that right is still subject to reasonable
deprivations by government authorities.
C. McCauley Rights and Self-Incrimination
After McCauley, the Illinois Supreme Court has generally interpreted
the other guarantees of article I, section 10 the same as their federal
counterparts. The court, for instance, has reasoned that the protection
against self-incrimination under the Illinois Constitution is worded nearly
the same as in the Fifth Amendment, and because nothing in the
constitutional convention debates showed an intent that it be construed
differently than its federal counterpart, the Illinois protection, like the
Fifth Amendment protection, extends only to fears of prosecution by the
government of this country, and not foreign governments.198 Applying
similar reasoning, the court has followed the federal interpretation of the
privilege against self-incrimination in a case involving whether the
invocation of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel in one proceeding
constitutes the invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel as to
63.
198. Relsolelo v. Fisk, 760 N.E.2d 963, 967–68 (Ill. 2001). In Relsolelo v. Fisk, the defendant
sought to exercise his protection against self-incrimination in a civil proceeding because he feared
prosecution in Venezuela where criminal charges were pending against him. Id. at 964–65. The
Illinois Supreme Court applied the Fifth Amendment standard set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in United States v. Balsys, which, in the Relsolelo court’s words, held that the “fear
of foreign prosecution was beyond the scope of the [F]ifth [A]mendment’s self-incrimination
clause.” Id. at 966 (discussing United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 66, 670 (1998)). In declining to
depart from lockstep on this point, the court explained that “there is absolutely no indication in
either the Record of Proceedings or the Committee on the Bill of Rights of the Constitutional
Convention that the drafters intended the Illinois privilege to differ from the federal counterpart as
regarding fear of foreign prosecution.” Id. at 967–68 (citing 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra
note 68, at 1376–80; 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 76, at 43–44). The court noted that
the language of the self-incrimination privilege was “virtually identical” and that there was “no
evidence in the language” of article I, section 10 that indicated an intention that the protection
should be interpreted differently than the Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Accordingly, “substantial
grounds” for departure from lockstep were not present. Id. at 967–69 (“The case at hand provides
no such substantial grounds for departing from the federal interpretation of the self-incrimination
privilege.”). The court went on to distinguish McCauley’s departure from lockstep on the article I,
section 10 right to counsel, explaining that there was evidence in the convention debates that the
delegates intended to incorporate “then-existing federal constitutional principles regarding
incommunicado interrogation.” Id. at 968–69.
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uncharged offenses.199
Additionally, despite differences in wording, the court interprets the
double jeopardy clause of the article I, section 10200 the same as the Fifth
Amendment’s double jeopardy protection.201 Of note, the court has taken
the step of departing from stare decisis and overruling prior Illinois
precedent to bring Illinois law in line with federal double jeopardy
jurisprudence.202
Thus, while the Illinois Supreme Court in McCauley found a broader
right to the presence of counsel within this provision (as well as the state
due process clause) than the federal courts have found under the Fifth
Amendment, the rest of the protections provided by article I, section 10
generally track their federal counterpart.

199. People v. Perry, 590 N.E.2d 454 (Ill. 1992). The court followed the Supreme Court’s
reasoning in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991). Id. at 456. In declining to depart from
lockstep, the court found that “the Supreme Court’s analysis and conclusion in McNeil adequately
safeguard the competing objectives of effective law enforcement and an individual’s privilege
against self-incrimination confronting us.” Id.
200. “No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” ILL. CONST. of 1970
art. I, 10. The Fifth Amendment is worded in a slightly different manner: “[N]or shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.” U.S. CONST. amend.
V. The Illinois Supreme Court has rejected the argument that the Federal Constitution’s reference
to “life or limb” provides a more restricted scope than the Illinois constitutional provision. People
v. Levin, 623 N.E.2d 317, 327–28 (Ill. 1993).
201. People v. Colon, 866 N.E.2d 207, 223 (Ill. 2007) (explaining that nothing in the convention
debates, the language of the state constitution, or tradition of the State warrants departure from
lockstep); see In re P.S., 676 N.E.2d 656, 661 (Ill. 1997) (“[W]e have previously interpreted our
own state constitution’s double jeopardy clause in a manner that is consistent with the United States
Supreme Court’s interpretation of the double jeopardy clause of the [F]ifth [A]mendment.”) (citing
Levin, 623 N.E.2d at 327–28). The majority and dissent in In re P.S. engaged in a discussion over
whether the court should continue to follow the lockstep doctrine. Chief Justice Heiple, in dissent,
argued that the bill of rights of the Illinois Constitution was ratified at a time when most of the
Federal Bill of Rights had been deemed applicable to state governments. Id. at 662 (Heiple, C.J.,
dissenting). This led the Chief Justice to conclude that Illinois’ bill of rights “must therefore have
been intended to serve as an additional protection against abuses of power by state government,
supplemental to the safeguards provided by the United States Constitution.” Id. The Chief Justice
wrote: “I believe that our oaths of office require ‘that the seven justices of this court . . . bring to
bear on every important constitutional issue their independent reasons of wisdom, judgment, and
experience.’” Id. at 663 (quoting People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 880–81 (Ill. 1998)
(Clark, J., concurring)). The majority disagreed, stating that the dissent’s approach “leads to the
conclusion that similar provisions of the federal and state constitutions mean different things, even
though they are expressed in the same terms.” Id. at 858. This approach, according to the majority,
found no support in the convention proceedings and would require the court to find that the drafters
of the constitution “did not adopt well-established meanings when they used familiar words and
phrases but instead always meant something different.” Id.
202. Colon, 866 N.E. at 223–25 (overruling People v. Grayson, 319 N.E.2d 43 (Ill. 1974)). The
court in People v. Colon explained that it was unclear whether People v. Grayson was based on
federal or state constitutional law, but if it was a Fifth Amendment case, it misapplied federal law,
and if it was an article I, section 10 case, it was not justified in departing from lockstep.
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D. The Takings Clause: More Expansive Language for Certain
Situations, but Otherwise Lockstep
The necessity of overruling state precedent or otherwise changing prior
state law to track changes in federal law is an inherent part of the limited
lockstep approach.203 In Hampton v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation
District of Greater Chicago, the court addressed the effect of a United
States Supreme Court decision on Illinois law.204 Past Illinois precedent,
most specifically People ex rel. Pratt v. Rosenfield, found that a
temporary flood was not a taking of property within the meaning of the
Illinois Constitution.205 But contrary to Illinois precedent, in 2012, the
United States Supreme Court determined, in Arkansas Game & Fish
Commission v. United States, that a temporary flood constituted a
compensable taking under the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause.206
Contemplating the divergent holdings from past Illinois case law and the
United States Supreme Court, the Hampton court noted that the Illinois
constitutional takings provision is broader than the Fifth Amendment
because it provides a remedy from property that is “damaged, in addition
to property that is taken.”207 But the court held that the extra protection
was not implicated because the case raised only the issue of whether
property was “taken” as a constitutional matter, and not whether it was
“damaged.”208
The court found that the definition of a “taking” was the same under
the state and federal constitutions because, applying the Caballes II test,
there was no evidence that the convention delegates intended a different
interpretation and there was no state practice that required a different
analysis.209 Accordingly, federal law was “relevant to the determination
of whether government-induced temporary flooding is a taking pursuant
to the Illinois Constitution.”210 The court then reconciled prior Illinois
law with Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, reasoning that state law
did not hold that temporary flooding can never constitute a taking, and
incorporated the United States Supreme Court’s standards articulated in
203. The Illinois Supreme Court has made clear that the Supreme Court cannot overrule one of
its decisions interpreting the state constitution, but that it will “follow the lead” of the United States
Supreme Court when it is interpreting state law in lockstep with federal law. Hampton v. Metro.
Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi., 2016 IL 119861, ¶¶ 9–10, 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1233–34.
204. Id. ¶ 31–32, 57 N.E.3d at 1240.
205. People ex rel. Pratt v. Rosenfield, 77 N.E.2d 697, 700 (Ill. 1948).
206. 131 S. Ct. 511 (2012).
207. Hampton, 2016 IL 119861, ¶ 31, 57 N.E.3d 1229, 1240.
208. Id.
209. Id. ¶¶ 13–15, 57 N.E.3d at 1235–36; see id. ¶ 31; 57 N.E.3d at 1240 (“However, what
constitutes a taking is the same under both clauses.”).
210. Id.
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the federal case into Illinois law for the purpose of determining whether
a taking occurred.211 The court ultimately found that under the Arkansas
Game & Fish Commission test, the plaintiffs did not allege a taking under
Illinois law.212
Justice Burke, joined by Justices Freeman and Kilbride, specially
concurred. She believed that prior Illinois law could not be reconciled
with Arkansas Game & Fish Commission, so the court should explicitly
overrule the prior state law.213 Applying the limited lockstep approach,
Justice Burke concluded that it was appropriate to adopt the test set out
by the United States Supreme Court as a matter of Illinois constitutional
law.214 The debate between the justices in Hampton demonstrates the
effect the limited lockstep doctrine can have on long-established Illinois
law. Pratt was decided almost seventy years earlier and had been the law
of Illinois since. But a consequence of the limited lockstep doctrine was
either that the rule of that case was amended as a result of the United
States Supreme Court’s decision, as the majority held, or that Pratt was
to be overruled altogether, as the three specially concurring justices felt.
E. The Right to an Abortion—Lockstep Interpretation
The Illinois Supreme Court has read the right to an abortion protected
by the Illinois Constitution to be coextensive with the federal right. In
Hope Clinic for Women, Ltd. v. Flores,215 the court considered the
constitutionality of the Parental Notice of Abortion Act of 1995.216 That
statute prohibits a physician from performing an abortion upon an
unemancipated minor unless forty-eight hours’ notice is given to an adult
family member, with certain exceptions. After a federal appellate court
upheld the law on federal constitutional grounds,217 it was challenged in
an Illinois court under the state constitution. The first question the court
addressed was the origin and the scope of the right to an abortion under
the Illinois Constitution. The plaintiffs argued that the privacy clause of
article I, section 6 secured the right, while the defendants argued that it
was a substantive due process right that would be construed the same as
the right under the Federal Constitution—under lockstep.218 The court
acknowledged that the privacy clause of the Illinois Constitution has no
211. Id. ¶ 25, 57 N.E.3d at 1239.
212. Id. ¶ 32, 57 N.E.3d at 1240. The court did not reach the issue of whether the flooding
“damaged” plaintiffs’ property. Id. ¶ 33, 57 N.E.3d at 1241.
213. Id. ¶ 44, 57 N.E.3d at 1243 (Burke, J., specially concurring).
214. Id. ¶ 45, 57 N.E.3d at 1243.
215. 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 1, 991 N.E.2d 745.
216. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 70/1 (1995).
217. Zbaraz v. Madigan, 572 F.3d 370 (7th Cir. 2009).
218. Hope Clinic, 2013 IL 112673, ¶¶ 35–37, 991 N.E.2d at 754.
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federal analogue,219 but found the drafters of the Illinois Constitution
explicitly ruled out extending the clause to abortion issues.220 The court
then turned to the Illinois due process clause of article I, section 2, and
applied the limited lockstep test. The court noted the lengthy debates
during the constitutional convention regarding abortion, including
whether language should be added to the due process provision to provide
rights to “the unborn.”221 But the ultimate conclusion of the debates was
that the Illinois Constitution’s “due process clause remained
unchanged.”222 Accordingly, the court found no reason to depart from
the federal courts’ interpretation of the federal due process protection of
the abortion right.223 The court ultimately upheld the Illinois statute,
relying on federal decisions upholding similar or more intrusive statutes
as a matter of federal constitutional law.224
F. Free Speech Rights Under the Illinois Constitution—Sometimes
More Expansive, Sometimes Not
One area that receives significant discussion is the protection of free
speech rights. The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no
219. Id. ¶ 42, 991 N.E.2d at 756.
220. Id. ¶ 45, 991 N.E.2d at 757. The court quoted a passage from the constitutional convention
debates in which one delegate asked Elmer Gertz, the Chairman of the Bill of Rights Committee,
to clarify that the privacy provision “has absolutely nothing to do with abortion.” Delegate Gertz
responded: “It certainly has nothing to do with abortion.” 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note
68, at 1537. At the time of the convention, of course, the Supreme Court had not decided Roe v.
Wade or Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, which located an abortion
right in the substantive due process protections of the United States Constitution. As part of its
analysis, the court rejected the argument that its prior decision in Family Life League v. Department
of Public Aid, 493 N.E.2d 1054 (Ill. 1986), found that the right to privacy included an abortion
right. Hope Clinic, 2013 IL 112673, ¶¶ 38–40, 991 N.E.2d at 755. In Family Life League, the
court did state that the “right of privacy guaranteed by the penumbra of the Bill of Rights of the
United States Constitution was also secured by the drafters of the 1970 Constitution of the State of
Illinois.” Family Life League, 493 N.E.2d at 1056 (citing ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, §§ 6, 12). The
Hope Clinic court found that it was “highly unlikely that the court intended, by this statement, not
only to decide the rather weighty question of whether our state constitution guarantees the right to
abortion, but also to conclude that such a right is guaranteed by our privacy clause, without
providing any analysis to support such findings.” Hope Clinic, 2013 IL 112673, ¶ 40, 991 N.E.2d
at 755. Additionally, the court noted, the Family Life League statement was dicta. Id.
221. Id. ¶¶ 51–54, 991 N.E.2d at 758–60.
222. Id. ¶ 55, 991 N.E.2d at 760.
223. Id. Justice Thomas, joined by Justices Kilbride and Karmeier, wrote separately that, in
their view, the Illinois Constitution’s due process clause did not provide a right to abortion. Id. ¶¶
115–40, 991 N.E.2d at 772–79. Instead, after a lengthy discussion of the convention debates, they
concluded that the drafters intended to leave abortion out of the constitution altogether and leave
the matter of regulating abortion to the General Assembly. Id. ¶¶ 116, 140, 991 N.E.2d at 172, 179.
224. Id. ¶ 94, 991 N.E.2d at 769 (“Finding no reason to depart from lockstep here, we adopt the
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in holding that the Illinois Parental Notice of
Abortion Act of 1995 does not violate our state constitutional guarantees of due process and equal
protection.”).
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law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.”225 The Illinois
Constitution contains a similar protection, but the words of the guarantee
are very different: “All persons may speak, write and publish freely,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty.” 226 The 1970
Constitution’s free speech provision mirrors the language of its
predecessor,227 and Illinois courts have long acknowledged under the
1870 Constitution that the language may provide a more expansive
protection than the First Amendment. For instance, the Illinois Supreme
Court confronted a request to enjoin the publication of allegedly
defamatory material in Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America, C.I.O.228 When
examining whether free speech principles precluded the issuance of the
injunction, the court found that the language of the 1870 Constitution was
“broader than that of the [C]onstitution of the United States, which
merely prohibited Congress from making any law abridging freedom of
speech or of the press.”229 Similarly, the court also held that the Illinois
Constitution “is even more far-reaching than that of the [C]onstitution of
the United States in providing that every person may speak freely, write
and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the use of that
liberty.”230
Although courts recognized that Illinois’ free speech provision was
more expansive than its federal counterpart—by virtue of the different
wording of the two provisions—that difference was not dispositive in any
case. Instead, courts typically found that the provisions were both
satisfied or violated.231 In People v. DiGuida, a case that emerged under
225. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
226. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 4. This provision continues: “In trials for libel, both civil and
criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense.” Id.
227. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II, § 4 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all
subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty; and in all trials for libel, both civil and
criminal, the truth, when published with good motives and for justifiable ends, shall be a sufficient
defense.”).
228. 79 N.E.2d 46, 50 (Ill. 1948).
229. Id. In denying the requested injunctive relief, the court, however, did not rely on the
broader reach of the state constitutional protection. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. United Retail,
Wholesale & Department Store Employees of America, C.I.O. involved a long-running labor
dispute between the retailer and several unions in which the company attempted to obtain a court
order preventing the unions from publishing material that, among other things, referred to the
company’s officers and staff “in scurrilous and opprobrious terms.” Id. at 48.
230. Vill. of S. Holland v. Stein, 26 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ill. 1940). The court in Village of South
Holland v. Stein found that the conduct at ordinance at issue, which prohibited soliciting magazine
subscriptions without a permit, violated both the state and federal constitutions. Id.
231. One appellate court recently described the State’s free speech protection as “generally
coextensive” with the First Amendment right. People v. Relerford, 2016 IL App (1st) 132531, ¶
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the 1970 Illinois Constitution after Tisler, the defendant challenged his
criminal trespass conviction for collecting signatures on a politicalnominating petition on a local grocery store’s private property. 232 By the
time of the appeal, the defendant maintained his challenge under only the
Illinois Constitution because United States Supreme Court precedent
foreclosed his challenge as a matter of federal law.233
In addressing the free speech aspect of the challenge, the state appellate
court noted that courts described the free speech guarantee as broader
under the state constitution, and found that the constitutional convention
debates “clearly show that the delegates intended article I, section 4 to be
independent of the Federal Constitution.”234 According to the appellate
court, even though the Federal Constitution states that Congress shall
make no law abridging the freedom of speech, the Illinois provision is not
limited to deprivation by governmental action and the Illinois
Constitution is framed as a positive right permitting each person to speak
freely. 235 Therefore, pursuant to the appellate court’s analysis, the
Illinois Constitution could be applied in certain circumstances when
private parties deprive one’s free speech rights.236 In that case, the
grocery store permitted political activity on its premises, and thus
“created a public forum or accommodation for expressionist activity.” 237
Having done that, the appellate court held, the store owner could not
exclude “particular expressionists upon purely discriminatory or arbitrary
grounds.”238
The Illinois Supreme Court reversed.239 The court found that, while
the delegates of the constitutional convention did not discuss free
expression while on private property, they recognized that the state
constitution “may provide greater protection to free speech than does its

16, 56 N.E.3d 489, 493, petition for leave to appeal allowed, 65 N.E.3d 845 (Ill. 2016). A federal
district court has found that “[c]ourts have analyzed claims under the federal and state constitutions
together while keeping in mind that protection of these liberties under the Illinois Constitution is
broader than that under the United States Constitution.” Irshad Learning Ctr. v. Cty. of DuPage,
804 F. Supp. 3d 697, 719 (N.D. Ill. 2011). In Irshad Learning Center v. County of DuPage, the
court found no authority for the proposition that the Illinois Constitution provided greater free
speech and free assembly protection to a religious organization that was denied a conditional use
permit to operate a private school on residential property. Id.
232. People v. DiGuida, 576 N.E.2d 126, 127–28 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
233. Id. at 131–32.
234. Id. at 134.
235. Id. at 135.
236. Id.
237. Id. at 136.
238. Id.
239. People v. DiGuida, 604 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1992).

6_LEGNER (851-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

886

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/2/2017 11:08 AM

[Vol. 48

[f]ederal counterpart.”240 The court noted that, as opposed to the First
Amendment, article I, section 4 does not “expressly restrict its application
to governmental interference.”241 But that was not dispositive, because
other provisions of the Illinois Constitution, such as the protection against
invasions of privacy, have been found to protect only against government
action even though they contain no express textual restriction to that
effect.242 The court found that there may be situations where the Illinois
Constitution will provide a broader free speech right than the First
Amendment, but it held that the state-action requirement of the First
Amendment was also a part of article I, section 4.243 In reaching this
holding, the court relied on a long line of Illinois precedent that described
the protections of the constitution generally as being against improper
governmental conduct, not private action.244
Additionally, the court did not find anything in the convention debates
stating that the delegates intended the free speech protection to extend to
private action or that the delegates intended to change the character of the
protection provided by the 1870 Constitution.245 The court found this
significant because when Illinois adopted that earlier charter, the Federal
Constitution operated only against the federal government and “the State
bills of rights operated as a limitation only upon the powers of State
government.”246 Moreover, other states with similarly worded free
speech protections applied those protections only to state action.247 Thus,
based on: (1) the convention proceedings; (2) past Illinois precedent; (3)
decisions of other jurisdictions; and (4) “generally accepted doctrine
concerning the reach of constitutional provisions,” the court found that
article I, section 4 did not apply to private action.248 Because the requisite
state action did not exist, the conviction did not violate the defendant’s
free speech rights under the Illinois Constitution.249
While the DiGuida court acknowledged that article I, section 4 may
provide greater free speech protection than the First Amendment, in
practice it has generally been found to provide the same protections as
the federal right. In City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., the
court examined a challenge to a Chicago ordinance that regulated nude
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.

Id. at 343.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing BRADEN & COHN, supra note 18, at 5).
Id. at 344–45.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 347.
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and seminude dancing.250 The circuit court invalidated the ordinance
under both the state and federal constitutions.251 On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court rejected the First Amendment claim and then turned to
whether the ordinance violated the free speech guarantee of the state
constitution.252 The court relied principally on a decision by the
Washington Supreme Court construing a Washington constitutional
provision similar to that of Illinois.253 Much like the interpretation of the
Illinois free speech right, the Washington court explained that its state
constitutional provision “justifies a more protective standard for
evaluating governmental restrictions on political speech”254 and “has
been found to warrant greater protection for speech, both spoken and
written, in some contexts.”255 But because the text of the provision
“mentions only the right to speak, write and publish,” and does not refer
to “expressive conduct,” the Washington court found that the
constitutional text did not justify “extending greater protection to the
adult performances at issue here.”256 The court also found that the
differences in the text between the First Amendment and the Washington
free speech provision did not justify a more expansive protection, the
State’s constitutional convention did not show that the framers intended
to provide greater protection to expressive conduct, and Washington’s
history did not warrant a more protective analysis than is applied under
the First Amendment.257
In addition to relying on Washington’s analysis, the Illinois Supreme
Court relied on decisions from seven other states with similar free speech
provisions that did not afford greater protection to nude dancing.258
250. 865 N.E.2d 133 (Ill. 2006).
251. Id. at 146.
252. Id. at 153–54.
253. Id. at 168–69 (citing Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 937 P.2d 154 (Wash. 1997)). Article
I, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides: “Every person may freely speak, write and
publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 5.
254. Ino Ino, 937 P.2d at 163.
255. Id. at 163.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 163–66. The Washington court’s analysis was based on its test set forth in State v.
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (1986), for determining when a Washington court should “resort to the
Washington Constitution for separate and independent state grounds of decision. Id. at 162. The
“nonexclusive criteria” the court should consider are: (1) textual language; (2) differences in the
text of the state and federal constitutional provisions; (3) Washington’s constitutional history; (4)
preexisting Washington state law; (5) structural differences between the state and federal
constitutions; and (6) unique state or local concerns. Id.
258. City of Chi. v. Pooh Bah Enters., Inc., 865 N.E.2d 133, 168–69 (Ill. 2006). Those seven
states are: Alabama, Arizona, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, Montana, and Ohio. The court noted
that Massachusetts did provide greater free speech protection to nude dancing, but was persuaded
by the majority view. Id. at 169.
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Based on the absence of any express language in article I, section 4
referring to expressive conduct259 and the majority view as exemplified
by Washington’s decision, the court held that the Illinois Constitution
does not provide greater protection to nude dancing than the First
Amendment.260 Because the federal challenge failed, the state claim also
failed.261
With respect to the establishment clause,262 the court examined the
scope of the state constitution’s protection under the 1870 Constitution in
People ex rel. Ring v. Board of Education of District 24.263 In that case,
the plaintiffs challenged the practice in local public schools of reading
the Bible, singing hymns, and repeating the Lord’s Prayer. At that point
in history (1910), the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause did not
apply against the states, so the court was required to address the matter
under only the Illinois Constitution.264 The court found that the
complained-of conduct was “religious worship” and that reading the
Bible constituted sectarian instruction that violated the state
constitution.265 The United States Supreme Court would not invalidate
school prayer under the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause for
another half century.266
Ultimately, however, the fact that the Illinois Constitution’s
protections might have presaged the federal protections in this regard
does not mean that courts give the state establishment clause a broader
meaning than its federal counterpart. On the contrary, the restrictions
imposed by Illinois’ establishment clause are “identical” to those of the
First Amendment.267 Thus, in examining the reach of the ecclesiastical
abstention doctrine—which prohibits civil courts from deciding issues
involving religious dogma—the free exercise and establishment clauses
of both constitutions have been found to provide similar protections,268
259. It has been suggested that, under City of Chicago v. Pooh Bah Enterprises, Inc., article I,
section 4 extends less protection to dancing than the First Amendment. People v. Relerford, 2016
IL App (1st) 132531, ¶ 16, 56 N.E.3d 489, 493; LOUSIN, supra note 15, at 46.
260. Pooh Bah Enters., 865 N.E.2d at 169.
261. Id.
262. The establishment clause of the 1970 Constitution provides that “[n]o person shall be
required to attend or support any ministry or place of worship against his consent, nor shall any
preference be given by law to any religious denomination or mode of worship.” ILL. CONST. of
1970 art. I, § 3.
263. 92 N.E. 251 (Ill. 1910).
264. Id. at 251–52.
265. Id. at 257.
266. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
267. People v. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d 200, 206–07 (Ill. 2000).
268. See Susan v. Romanian Orthodox-Episcopate of Am., 2012 IL App (1st) 120697-U, ¶ 4
(discussing the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine); Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102, 1109–10
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and the same analysis applies under both constitutions to laws that create
criminal penalties for conduct occurring within proximity to a church.269
The Illinois Constitution also contains a separate restriction on the
establishment of religion related to education that is housed outside of the
bill of rights. That restriction is found in article X of the Illinois
Constitution—the “education article.” The third section of that article270
prohibits the use of public funds for sectarian education.271 Illinois courts
have held that this provision’s restrictions on the establishment of religion
related to education are identical to the restrictions in the First
Amendment.272
The Illinois Constitution also contains a separate protection for the
right of assembly.273 The scope of that right is the subject of an action
that the City of Chicago brought against a group of protestors affiliated
with Occupy Chicago for violating a municipal ordinance that prohibited
persons from remaining in Chicago parks from 11:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
The circuit court dismissed the charges against the defendants and found
that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it violated equal
(Ill. App. Ct. 2008) (considering the trial court’s application of the ecclesiastical abstention
doctrine).
269. Falbe, 727 N.E.2d at 207.
270. Article X, section 3 provides:
Neither the General Assembly nor any county, city, town, townships, school district, or
other public corporation, shall ever make any appropriation or pay from any public fund
whatever, anything in aid of any church or sectarian purposes, or to help support or
sustain any school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific
institution, controlled by any church or sectarian denomination whatever; nor shall any
grant or donation of land, money, or other personal property ever be made by the State,
or any such public corporation, to any church, or for any sectarian purpose.
ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. X, § 3.
271. This provision is the same as the provision that appeared in the 1870 Illinois Constitution.
See ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VIII, § 3. This provision was a so-called “Blaine Amendment,” named
after Maine congressman James G. Blaine, who introduced an unsuccessful effort to amend the
Federal Constitution to prohibit the use of public funds to support religious institutions. Fonte,
Zelman v. Simmons-Harris: Authorizing School Vouchers, Education’s Winning Lottery Ticket, 34
LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 479, 496–98 (describing anti-Catholic sentiment that prompted thirty states to
adopt explicit prohibitions on the use of public funds for sectarian purposes in their constitutions).
272. People ex rel. Klinger v. Howlett, 305 N.E.2d 129, 130 (Ill. 1973); Bd. of Educ. Sch. Dist.
No. 142, Cook Cty. v. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d 737, 744–46 (Ill. 1973). In Cook County v. Bakalis,
which concerned public bussing for parochial school students, Justice Ryan wrote separately to
assert that he believed article X, section 3 did not have the same meaning as the First Amendment’s
Establishment Clause. Bakalis, 299 N.E.2d at 749–52 (Ryan, J., specially concurring). He noted
that the convention delegates rejected substituting the language of the First Amendment for the
1870 provision during the 1970 convention and that the more specific text of the Illinois provision,
applying to aid to public schools, should be given a more restrictive meaning than the general
language of the First Amendment. Id.
273. Article I, section 5 of the Illinois Constitution states: “The people have the right to
assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good, to make known their opinions to
their representative and to apply for redress of grievances.” ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 5.
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protection and the right to free assembly under the Illinois
Constitution.274 On appeal, the appellate court initially found that the
ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction that did not
violate the First Amendment,275 and that the ordinance was not enforced
selectively in violation of the defendants’ right to equal protection.276
The Illinois Supreme Court exercised its supervisory authority to vacate
that decision and direct the appellate court to review whether the Chicago
ordinance violated the defendants’ right to free assembly under both the
First Amendment and article I, section 5 of the Illinois Constitution.277
On remand, the appellate court held the 1970 convention proceedings
showed that the framers intended to provide a broader right to assembly
than the First Amendment.278 The court considered the substantive effect
of a small change from the 1870 Constitution’s right to assembly in the
1970 version. Previously, the right to assemble stated: “The people have
the right to assemble in a peaceable manner to consult for the common
good, to make known their opinions to their representatives and to apply
for redress of grievances.”279 The 1970 Constitution adds a comma after
“manner,” so that the provision now reads that the people “have the right
to assemble in a peaceable manner, to consult for the common good . . .
.”280 The purpose of the addition was to clarify that the right to assemble
was independent and “not subject to qualification by the succeeding
phrases,” even if the assembly is not to consult for the common good.281
Whereas the First Amendment right to assembly was limited to assembly
for expressive purposes, the court found this Illinois right was protected
regardless of purpose. The appellate court, however, considered this a
“slight” difference from the First Amendment right.282 The court further
found that individuals gathered for nonexpressive purposes did not have
a greater right to assemble than individuals gathered for expressive
274. See City of Chi. v. Alexander (Alexander II), 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B, ¶ 57, 46 N.E.3d
1207, 1226 (discussing the trial court’s view of the ordinance); City of Chi. v. Alexander
(Alexander I), 2014 IL App (1st) 122858, ¶ 1, 24 N.E.3d 262, 266 (reversing the judgment of the
circuit court).
275. Alexander I, 2014 IL App (1st) 122858, ¶ 31, ¶ 44, 24 N.E.3d 262, 272, 275.
276. Id. ¶ 51, 24 N.E.3d at 1224. The defendants argued that the City of Chicago enforced the
ordinance against them, but the City did not prosecute the spectators who attended the rally at Grant
Park on November 4, 2008, to witness President-elect Obama’s victory speech for remaining in the
park after 11:00 p.m. Id. ¶ 48, 24 N.E.3d at 1224. The court found that the two groups were not
similarly situated for equal protection purposes. Id. ¶ 51, 24 N.E.3d at 1224.
277. City of Chi. v. Alexander, 32 N.E.3d 670 (2015) (memorandum).
278. Alexander II, 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B, ¶ 61, 46 N.E.3d 1207, 1227.
279. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. II, § 17.
280. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 5.
281. 3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 68, at 1480 (statement by delegate, Fr. Lawlor).
282. Alexander II, 2015 IL App (1st) 122858-B, ¶ 63, 46 N.E.3d 1207, 1227.
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purposes under either the state or federal constitutions. 283 Moreover,
such assembly was still subject to the First Amendment’s “same time,
place, and manner” analysis.284 At the time of this writing, the case
remains pending on appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court.285
In sum, the United States Constitution’s First Amendment protections
of the right to speech, the right to assemble, the right to free exercise of
religion, and the protection against establishment of religion are
embodied in four separate provisions of the Illinois Constitution. Illinois
courts recognize that the right to free speech in article I, section 4 is
broader than the First Amendment right, in large part because it expressly
provides for the right not just to speak but also write and publish. Outside
of those three rights, the protections are less certain, such as the case with
nude dancing. And while courts recognize the broader scope of article I,
section 4, generally that has no substantive effect on a case. Courts
typically read the separate right to free exercise and the establishment
clause in article I, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution in a coextensive
manner with those rights under the Federal Constitution. So, too, is the
specific antiestablishment of religion clause related to education located
in article X, section 3. Finally, the right to assemble in article I, section
5 is broader than the First Amendment right because it does not contain
the same textual qualifications related to the purpose of the assembly, but
so far, courts have held that the provision is subject to the same
restrictions as the federal right.
G. The Right to a Jury Trial Under the Illinois Constitution—A More
Expansive Right
One area where the Illinois Constitution unquestionably provides a
broader right than the United States Constitution is in the right to a jury
trial. The Illinois Supreme Court examined the interpretation of the
criminal jury trial right post-Tisler in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce.286 At
issue in Joyce was the constitutionality of a state statute that provided that
the State must consent to the waiver of a jury trial in certain cases.287
Pursuant to that statute, a criminal defendant could not unilaterally waive
a jury trial where only felony charges brought under certain drug-related
laws were at issue. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court,
as a matter of Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, likely would uphold the
law because criminal defendants did not have a right to force a bench
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. ¶ 63, 46 N.E.3d at 1227.
Id. ¶¶ 63–64, 46 N.E.3d at 1227–28.
City of Chi. v. Alexander, 50 N.E.3d 1139 (Ill. 2016).
533 N.E.2d 873 (Ill. 1988).
725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-1 (1992).
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trial.288 Moreover, under federal law, the government has an interest
protected by the Constitution in trying cases before a jury.289
But the text and structure of the Illinois Constitution differs from the
Federal Constitution in this regard. To start, article I, section 13 provides
that the “right of trial by jury as heretofore enjoyed shall remain
inviolate.”290 The inclusion of the “as heretofore” language signified an
intention to constitutionalize certain common law aspects of the jury trial
right.291 In addition to that section, the Illinois Constitution contained a
separate provision that tracked the Sixth Amendment’s protections and
provided that in criminal proceedings, “the accused shall have the right .
. . to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury.” 292 Thus, two places in
the Illinois Constitution provided the jury trial right and both places were
in the bill of rights, which guaranteed certain rights to the people, not the
government.293 On the other hand, the Federal Constitution provided the
accused a jury trial right in the Sixth Amendment, but also provided that
the trial of all crimes shall be by a jury in Article III, which defines
judicial powers.294 In that way, the jury trial right was not necessarily
only a right of the accused. Because of these substantive differences, the
court found that it should give the Illinois jury trial right “meaning
independent of the construction the [f]ederal courts have placed on the
jury trial provisions of the Federal Constitution.”295
Turning to the history of the jury trial right in Illinois, the court found
that the floor debates of the constitutional convention revealed that the
delegates did not intend to change the right to a jury trial as it then
existed.296 According to the court, the law in Illinois at that time was that
the accused could waive the right to a jury trial and the State did not have
288. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875 (discussing Singer v. U.S., 380 U.S. 24 (1965)). In Singer v.
United States, the Court explained that although a defendant can waive a jury trial right, he does
not have the “right to insist upon the opposite of that right.” Singer, 380 U.S. at 34–35.
289. Id. at 36 (“We find no constitutional impediment to conditioning a waiver of this right on
the consent of the prosecuting attorney and the trail judge when, if either refuses to consent, the
result is simply that the defendant is subject to an impartial trial by jury—the very thing that the
Constitution guarantees him. The Constitution recognizes an adversary system as the proper
method of determining guilt, and the Government, as a litigant, has a legitimate interest in seeing
that cases in which it believes a conviction is warranted are tried before the tribunal which the
Constitution regards as most likely to produce a fair result.”).
290. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 13.
291. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875–86.
292. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 8. The court in People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce noted that article
I, section 8 enumerated other “rights of the accused” that were listed in the Sixth Amendment as
well. 533 N.E.2d at 875.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 875–86.
296. Id. at 877.
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a right to a jury trial.297 In rejecting the argument that the State had a
right to a jury trial under the 1970 Constitution, the court held “[t]his
simply turns the concept of our bill of rights on its head.”298
The Illinois Supreme Court recently confronted the question of what
right to jury trial was “heretofore enjoyed” in civil cases. Effective June
1, 2015, section 5/2-1105(b) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was
amended to read: “All jury cases shall be tried by a jury of 6.” 299
Previously, that statute permitted a six-person jury for damages claims of
less than $50,000, though it required a twelve-person jury in those cases
if either party demanded it.300 The new statute thus removed the option
of a twelve-member jury in all civil cases.
In Kakos v. Butler, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the
constitutionality of that statute.301 The court first noted that the United
States Supreme Court had interpreted the Seventh Amendment right to a
jury trial to permit juries of less than twelve people as a matter of federal
law; and as part of that analysis, the court concluded that the Federal
Constitution did not protect certain common-law elements of a jury trial,
including the size of the jury.302 In contrast to the Federal Constitution,
the court found that by using the language “as heretofore enjoyed” in
article I, section 13, the drafters intended the Illinois Constitution to
“maintain common-law characteristics of jury trials” and for that reason,
construed “the right of trial by jury protected by the Illinois Constitution
differently than the rights protected by the [F]ederal [C]onstitution.”303
297. Id. at 877–78 (discussing People v. Spegal, 125 N.E.2d 468 (Ill. 1955)).
298. Id.at 877. Perhaps foretelling subsequent litigation, the court also noted: “When we speak
of jury rights as they existed in the common law, we are encompassing more than a concept of 12
people unanimously deciding issues of fact.” Id. At 878. Justice Clark concurred in the judgment,
noting his displeasure with the Tisler test. Id. at 879–81 (Clark, J., concurring). He raised the point
subsequently raised in In re P.S. that given that the Federal Bill of Rights mostly applied to the
states, “there would be little point in writing parallel guarantees into any [s]tate constitution if those
guarantees were never to be interpreted more broadly. I cannot understand why anyone would want
to spill ink uselessly.” Id. at 880. Justice Clark continued that by including parallel guarantees in
the Illinois Constitution, the drafters meant to provide the “double protection” of “knowing that
seven justices of this court would bring to bear on every important constitutional issue their
independent resources of wisdom, judgment, and experience” even if it in the end resulted in no
more protection than was afforded under the Federal Constitution. Id. Justice Miller dissented,
arguing that nothing in the convention proceedings or the court’s past precedent supported a
constitutional right to demand a bench trial. Id. at 884 (Miller, J., dissenting).
299. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1105(b) (2015).
300. Id. at 5/2-1105(b).
301. 2016 IL 120377, ¶ 1, 63 N.E.3d 901, 903.
302. Id. ¶ 12, 63 N.E.3d at 905.
303. Id. ¶¶ 13–14, 63 N.E.3d at 905–06 (citing Joyce, 533 N.E.2d at 875–76). In his dissent in
Joyce, Justice Miller opined that “the term ‘as heretofore enjoyed’ is unquestionably ambiguous”
and that there was no support for the conclusion that inclusion of that language in article I, section
13 “was intended to ‘constitutionalize’ all existing judicial and statutory law pertaining to the
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In describing the right to a jury trial, Illinois courts long included
twelve-person composition as an element.304 Moreover, there was
“ample evidence” that the drafters thought that the jury trial right
demanded a twelve-person jury.305 During the 1970 constitutional
convention, the delegates initially adopted a provision—on the urging of
Chief Justice Underwood of the Illinois Supreme Court—that expressly
permitted the General Assembly to provide for civil jury trials of no less
than six and no more than twelve jurors and to permit less-thanunanimous verdicts in civil jury cases.306 Thus, at one point, the 1970
Constitution would have read: “The right to trial by jury as heretofore
enjoyed shall remain inviolate except that the General Assembly may
provide in civil cases for juries of not less than six nor more than twelve
and for verdicts by not less than three-fourths of the jurors.”307
The Convention delegates, however, had second thoughts. The
delegates subsequently passed amendments deleting, first, the
nonunanimity requirement and, second, the grant of permission to the
General Assembly to provide for juries of less than twelve in civil
cases.308 The delegates, thus, expressly considered and ultimately
rejected an express constitutional grant of authority to the General
Assembly to provide for six-member juries in civil cases. As Delegate
Gertz stated, “[s]o far as the constitution is concerned, the jury must be
one of twelve members in criminal or civil cases unless the parties
otherwise agree.”309 The court concluded that “the delegates believed the
size of the jury was an essential element of the right as enjoyed at the time
they were drafting the constitution and they deliberately opted not to
make any change to that element.”310 Because the size of the jury was an
essential element of the right, it was guaranteed by the constitution and
the amendment to the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure was
unconstitutional.311
right.”
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 884 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Butler, 2016 IL 120377, ¶¶ 15–18, 63 N.E.3d at 906–08.
Id. ¶ 22, 63 N.E.3d at 908.
3 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 68, at 1432.
Id.
4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS 3641 (1970).
309. 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS 4241 (1970) [hereinafter 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS].
310. Butler, 2016 IL 120377, ¶ 24, 63 N.E.3d at 909.
311. Id. ¶ 28, 63 N.E.3d at 911. The court invalidated the entire Public Act 98-1132, of which
the jury-size provision was a part. Id. ¶ 34, 63 N.E.3d at 912. The other part of that Act was an
increase in the daily pay for people on jury duty. See id. ¶ 6, 63 N.E.3d at 904 (discussing the
amendment to 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/4-11001). The court found that these two provisions together
were “intended to make jury trials more efficient and to incentivize citizens to participate in jury
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The jurisprudence regarding the jury trial right in Illinois, thus,
provides a striking example of the constitutional significance of this
state’s traditions, as reflected in its constitutional language but also its
case law.
H. The Equal Rights Provision—More Expansive Protection Against
Sex-Based Classifications
Concerned that the equal protection clause in the Illinois Constitution
did not afford sex-based classifications heightened scrutiny, 312 the
convention delegates adopted a floor amendment to provide explicit
protection against discrimination on the basis of sex.313 Article I, section
18 of the Illinois Constitution thus provides that “equal protection of the
laws shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex by the State or its
units of local government and school districts.”314 Soon after the 1970
Constitution was adopted,315 the Illinois Supreme Court had the
opportunity to interpret this provision in examining a challenge to a
provision of the Juvenile Court Act that provided that seventeen-year-old
males would be prosecuted as adults, but not seventeen-year-old
females.316 The court noted that the United States Supreme Court had
not found sex to be a suspect classification, but that it was “incumbent
upon the court to give meaning to every section and clause of the [Illinois
Constitution].”317 Thus, contrary to the Federal Constitution “which,
thus far, does not contain the Equal Rights Amendment,”318 the explicit
duty.” Id. ¶ 33, 63 N.E.3d at 911–12. The court reasoned: “If the provision raising the amount to
be paid to each juror remains valid while the provision reducing the size of the jury is invalidated,
then the legislative purpose would be frustrated. The cost of jury trials across the state will
dramatically increase without any offset.” Id. ¶ 34, 63 N.E.3d at 912.
312. As a matter of federal equal protection jurisprudence, sex-based classifications were given
intermediate scrutiny a few years later. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–98 (1976); Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971).
313. 5 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 309, at 3676.
314. ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 18.
315. After this provision was adopted, the General Assembly revised most of the statutes that
contained a sex-based classification. Almost all sex-based statutory classifications favored women
over men. See A. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION 66 (2011) (discussing Illinois’
constitutional evolution).
316. People v. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d 98 (Ill. 1974) (discussing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, par. 702-7(1)
(1971)).
317. Id. at 100–01 (quoting Oak Park Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Vill. of Oak Park, 296 N.E.2d
344, 346–47 (Ill. 1973) (construing article VII, section 6(l) concerning home-rule units of local
government).
318. At the time of People v. Ellis, the proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment, which had
been submitted to the states for ratification approximately two years earlier, provided that “equality
of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex.” 311 N.E.2d at 100–01 (quoting H.R.J. Res. No. 208, 92nd Cong. 2d Sess. (1972)).
Illinois never ratified the proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment. See The ERA in the States,
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language of article I, section 18 and the convention debates led the court
to the “inescapable” conclusion that sex-based classifications were
constitutionally suspect and subject to strict scrutiny. 319 And the
classification in the Juvenile Court Act failed this test.320
Subsequent to the adoption of the 1970 Illinois Constitution, the
Illinois General Assembly enacted the Illinois Human Rights Act in part
to “secure and guarantee the rights established by sections 17, 18 and 19
of article I of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.”321 Accordingly, there is
a statutory cause of action for sex discrimination in certain
circumstances.322 Nonetheless, the Illinois Supreme Court has since
entertained claims brought directly under article I, section 18 that
challenge a statute as creating an impermissible classification, as opposed
to claims of sex discrimination in areas such as employment, education,
or housing that are actionable under the Human Rights Act.323
Article I, section 18 of the Illinois Constitution thus provides a fitting
example of the use of a state constitution to provide protections deemed
important to that state’s citizens where federal law had not afforded such
protections and efforts to amend the United States Constitution had not
come to fruition.
CONCLUSION
The Illinois Constitution is a font of important rights. Most of the
litigation regarding those rights reasonably focuses on the protections that
the Illinois Constitution’s bill of rights provides because those provisions
accord important individual guarantees. The Illinois Constitution’s bill
EQUAL RTS. AMEND., equalrightsamendment.org/states.htm#IL (last visited May 6, 2017).
319. Ellis, 311 N.E.2d at 100–01.
320. Id. at 101.
321. 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-102(F) (2015). Article I, section 17 prohibits discrimination in
hiring and promotion practices and in the sale or rental of property on the basis of “race, color,
creed, national ancestry and sex.” ILL. CONST. of 1970 art. I, § 17. That provision states that the
rights conferred “are enforceable without action by the General Assembly,” but the General
Assembly may provide “reasonable exemptions” to the rights as well as additional remedies for
violations of the rights. Id. Article I, section 18, does not contain similar “enforceability” language,
but, as in Ellis, the provision has been read as a basis for direct constitutional actions. Article I,
section 19 prohibits discrimination on the basis of a “physical or mental handicap” and also lacks
the enforceability language of section 17. Id. art. I, § 19.
322. Illinois law is not entirely clear on whether certain civil rights claims for which a cause of
action is provided by the Human Rights Act must be brought under that statute, or whether a freestanding claim may be brought. See the discussion in Blount v. Stroud, 904 N.E.2d 1, 12–17 (Ill.
2009).
323. See, e.g., Hope Clinic, 2013 IL 112673, ¶¶ 102–105, 991 N.E.2d 745, 770–71 (discussing
the interpretation of article I, section 18 of the Illinois Constitution of 1970); In re Estate of Hicks,
675 N.E.2d 89, 92–98 (Ill. 1996) (same); People v. Adams, 597 N.E.2d 574, 584–85 (Ill. 1992)
(same).
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of rights overlap, at least in name, with their federal counterpart to a large
degree. That overlap, however, does not necessarily indicate that the
rights conferred by both constitutions are the same. But as a practical
matter, that is a result of the limited lockstep doctrine, founded as it is
upon a presumption that a court will interpret the state right in the same
manner as its federal counterpart. Nonetheless, that doctrine has adequate
flexibility to account for differences in Illinois’ legal tradition, expressed
either in the constitutional convention debates, the State’s statutory
history, or its court decisions, as seen with free-standing claims of
innocence under Illinois’ due process clause or the right to a jury trial.
Furthermore, the Illinois Constitution provides some important rights
that are not found in the United States Constitution. Thus, Illinois citizens
have a constitutional right to privacy in personal information that is
independent of the Federal Constitution, and laws that impose sex-based
classifications are subject to strict scrutiny, regardless of the United
States Supreme Court’s interpretation of the federal equal protection
clause. Additionally, the Illinois Constitution expressly provides rights
to a healthful environment and a free public education.
More than anything, the Illinois Constitution, and the Illinois Supreme
Court’s method of interpreting its provisions, ultimately reflect the values
of the State’s citizens. The document does not need to take into account
the varied values or concerns of citizens across the diverse breadth of all
fifty states, but rather can be responsive to more local beliefs and
problems. Those values are expressed in relatively recent terms, given
that the current state constitution is less than fifty years old. And because
of the relative ease—compared to the Federal Constitution—with which
the Illinois Constitution may be amended and the requirement that Illinois
citizens be given the opportunity to call for a new constitutional
convention every two decades, it can evolve to continually reflect the
values of the citizenry. State constitutions are often overlooked and
frequently under-studied as sources of rights and limitations, but they
offer unique solutions to many of modern society’s problems. The
Illinois Constitution of 1970 is a prime example.

